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The concept of interorganizational field refers to the pattern of
relationships or the context within which organizations negotiate or
compete to accomplish their goals.

This paper examines the proposition

that the type of interorganizational field shapes and· influences interactions between organizations.

To explore the nature of

~ny

contextual

effects, a hypothesis is extracted to represent each of four subareas
of the literature:

the transaction

or exchange, the resource

dependency, the communication, and.the division of labor subareas.

Non-

verification of the hypotheses indicates the extent and the manner in
which jnterorganizational fields can affect relations between organiza-

tions.
A case study of these hypotheses is presented for one type of
interorganizational field, a federation of social service agencies.
The federation includes eight organizations which delivered services •
and an administrative component to facilitate interagency coordination.
The data, which were gathered from project documents, monthly records,
and a series of interviews of representatives from each of these
organizations, permit

analysis of the federation's two-year tenure.

Analysis of these data leave three of the four hypotheses not verified,
with only the hypothesis on communication between organizations being
upheld.

These findings suggest that the ''norms of

rationalit~'

alleged to govern organizational decision-making are actually assessed
according to characteristics of the interorganizational context.

More

generally, the conclusion is that the interorganizational field level
of analysis merits further examination as a causal context.

By

specifying the nature of this context, it ultimately is possible to
theorize whether the effects of variables across fields are linear or
curvilinear, and whether interaction effects exist.
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CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPT OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS
Introduction
In a sense, many of the issues predominant in contemporary American society can be subsumed under an analysis of relationships between
organizations.

Broadly described, this topic encompasses a gamut of

organizational forms, ranging in size and power from large business
conglomerates to the local grocery store and in complexity from the
federal bureaucracy to neighborhood voluntary associations.

The

settings for interaction between such organizations can range from the
diplomacy of international contexts and race relations, to the provision
of community services, to profit-making enterprise.

And finally, inter-

organizational relationships also subsume a diversity of interactional
styles, including conflict, competition, cooperation, clandestine
associations, and overt contracts or treaties.
One particular societal focus of late which has provided an impetus for interorganizational research involves the innovations in the
relationships among human service agencies.

In recent years, for

example, the design for social welfare has shifted somewhat from
strategies emphasizing the funding of services and income subsidies to
a strategy of funding the organization of conununity services (Rothman,
1974).

This orientation culminated in a number of federally sponsored

programs, such as the Model Cities and the Ford Foundation "gray area"

2

programs, and it provoked extensive controversy regarding the feasibility of designing connnunity service systems (Marris and Rein, 1967).
A related effect of these programs was ·their dramatization of a
paucity of knowledge regarding the organization of human service
systems (Warren, 1971).

The interorganizational conceptual schemes

particularly at the inception of these programs appear in retrospect
as shallow and somewhat disjointed.

For example, the assumptions

underlying the expected consequences of connnunity innovations were
shown to be organizationally optimistic and at times even naive
(Warren, Rose, and Bergunder, 1974; Sundquist, 1969).

Often the

strength of existing agency ties was not foreseen (Levine, White, and
Vlasak, 1972).
In response to this theoretical lacuna, however,

ther~

has

recently been a veritable spate of essays on interorganizational relations (see Aldrich, 1976).

The accompanying intensification of

research has enumerated many of the factors influencing interaction
between organizations. (see Van de Ven, Emmett, and Koenig (1975).
Theoretical perspectives have been elaborated (Aldrich and Pfeffer,
1976).

Propositional inventories have been formulated (see, for ex-

ample, Litwak, 1970).

The results of research have accumulated.

Yet this rapid development has also created additional problems
and confusion.
accomplished.

Integration of theory and research still remains to be
In attempting to encompass a broad spectrum of insti-

tutional life, theorists have frequently chosen quite different variables and levels of analysis as objects of explanation (see Van de Ven,
Emmett, and Koenig· (1975).

The conceptualization and measurement of ·
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such commonly used variables as "domain" or resources" can differ widely. (contrast Thompson, 1967, and Warren, Rose, ·and Be:rgunder, 1974).
The·sheer diversity of organizations asks for differentiation.
In short, a distillation of concepts and orientations is in
·order.

The various emphases in the literature deserve clarification

and assessment.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the basis for such a
distillation.

The tack taken is to. classify xhe contexts of inter-

organizational activity by employing Warren's (1967) notion of interorganizational fields.

Prevalent hypotheses in the literature can then

be investigated, using data on interagency relationships in a social
service federation.
This empirical examination explores the differentiation of
interorganizational concepts according to the "field" of activity.
If the interorganizational field level of analysis is found to facilitate theory construction, suggestions for developing Warren's typology
into a model will be offered.

This design can be clarified by briefly

considering different levels of analysis (see Hall and Clark, 1975).

An organizational field refers to certain patterns or contexts of
organizations within which they negotiate or compete to accomplish
their goals.

Warren proposes that characteristics of these contexts

will affect the behavior of organizations within them.

Put abstractly,

his proposal is that the properties of a group of organizations exert
independent effects; they cannot -be 'reduced to character.is tics of the
organizations themselves.
Warren thus raises two issues of theory construction pertinent to

J
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assessing the level of analysis required for understanding relations
between organizations.

First, if the interorganizational field level

significantly influences organizational actions, then research can be
designed to discern the degree of these effects.

Here knowledge gained

by measuring the contexts of relationships can exist in addition to
the contributions of organizational or environmental level variables.
Speaking statistically, the total "variance explained" would be
increased because the effects can be added together.
Second, it is crucial to determine the nature of relationships
with a dependent variable.

Here the interorganizational field level

can be important by limiting or enhancing the relationships of other
"independent" variables with this dependent variable.

For example,

the context or field of the interaction can be an "antecedent" causal
factor which must be taken into account.

Thus, if a variable were

considered across a diversity of contexts, its effects upon other
variables might fluctuate significantly; curvilinear relationships or
"interaction effects" may emerge.

In fact, recent research indicates

that the interorganizational field level of analysis overrides the
relevance of many variables previously touted as important (see
Warren, Rose, and Bergunder, 1974).
In either case interorganizational models would benefit by considering the context of relationships.

On the one hand, variables

measuring interorganizational fields can be sufficient in explaining
such activity.

Perhaps more important, they can actually be necessary

for understanding interorganizational relationships.
After noting the distinctiveness of the interorganizational level

.................. ...
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of analysis, the remainder of this chapter discusses the interorganizational field typology and its relation to the theory construction
purposes of this paper.

The second chapter outlines two basic

approaches to the interorganizational literature.

This review high-

lights the prominence of certain variables around which a typology
of hypotheses is derived for later comparison with data from the case
study.

The third chapter consists of a discussion of the case study

methodology to be employed as well as particular methodological
problems accruing to the study of relations between organizations.
After the findings of the study are presented, a concluding chapter
proposes a theoretical framework for new hypotheses and areas for
future research.
Towards an Interorganizational Perspective
The current conceptual schemes on relations between organizations
evolved in part from a concern with applying organizational analysis
to community service and policy issues.

Interagency coordination,

for instance, was considered important to the various levels and
sectors of community functioning (see Johns and DeMarche, 1951; for
an insightful case study on one community's efforts at coordinating
service departments, see Mott, 1968).

This increasing interest in

community planning was joined over time by concern with coordination
between levels of government, such as the federalism of the past

I

decade (see Sundquist, 1969, for an

~verview

of this approach; for a

distinctive twist to these issues, see Lindbloom, 1965).
Broadly stated, this early approach appeared to emanate from the
human relations school in the organizational literature (see Hall, 1972:

6

Chapter One), in that it· considered community agencies as essentially
cooperative collectives (White, 1972).

Generally, the early tendency

was to accept -0rganizational goals as those expressed publicly by the

·organization. ~or human service agencies, including especially the
health and welfare sector, this approach meshed conveniently with a
philanthropic ideology; since these organizations would be responsive
if they could to the need for coordinative efforts, the theoretical
problem therefore was phrased to· assume the existence of systematic
barriers to cooperation itself.

Thus:

lack of mutual knowledge among the organizations was alleged
to be the main barrier; the solution therefore called for
mechanisms to encourage communication among the organizations
regarding their respectives needs and resources ... Sensitization of each organization in the given conununity to the
problems of each of the other organizations was the proposed
vehicle and mutual understanding the 1nticipated solution.
(Levine, White, and Vlasak, 1972).1
This early emphasis on conununication and cooperation between
organizations can still be occasionally recognized, as Aldrich has
asserted, in the implicit assumption in much of the literature that
interorganizational relations are "beneficial," especially from a
social engineering perspective. 2

It is thought that research on inter-

1warren has noted that the dominant, if unstated, ideology in
community planning, and by implication interorganizational analysis,
is based upon an underlying liberal, "consensus" model (1971) ; see also
Warren, Rose, and Bergunder, 1974. It would appear that as long as
community service problems are associated with "uncoordinated" services, his charge continues to be relevant.
2The conflict perspective, of course, takes exception with much
of this literature's emphasis. Unfortunately; this perspective. has not
been clearly extended to interorganizational relations, save for Litwak
and Hylton '-s (1962) contentions about "partial conflict." For possible
exceptions, see Howard Aldrich, 1972a and Litwak, 1970.
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organizational relations can tap the opportunity of providing "better"
services to clients with less duplication of effort and therefore
fewer resources invested.

Given the implication that only interagency

cooperation was involved, the policy issue became how to make decisions
which will yield "a higher aggregate utility than the market" (Warren,
1971:166).
More writers are now taking exception to these possibilities.
First, from a social policy perspective, the coordination of social
agencies in the pursuit of more effective service delivery is often
said to be fraught with dilemmas (see Marris and Rein, 1967; and
Gilbert and Specht, 1974; also, Levine, White, and Vlasak, 1972).

For

example, as the "coordination" between service agencies increases,
clients can find the service sector more monolithic and less accountable to their needs.
Second, some claim that adopting a more theoretical point of
view assists in systematically probing other pertinent factors.

For

instance, Litwak posits that the development of interorganizational
theory requires broader, social organization perspective.

He

emphasizes that it is a lack of centralized authority in relations be-

--

:

tween organizations which is a crucial characteristic, that in fact it
is precisely their lack of coordination which can make these relations
distinctive from intraorganizational analysis (Litwak and Hylton, 1962;
Litwak, 1970).

As evidence he cites the political theory

of "checks and balances," which holds that there are governmental
processes which are different from each other and which stem from
dis.crepant goals which must be preserved (1970: 141).

Similarly, the

8

preservation of the freedoms of religion and the press is given more
stability by being housed in organizational structures separate from
the government.

Finally, and most obviously, some forms of "coordi-

nation" in the economic sector can bring charges of "collusion" or
"price-fixing," with very different connotations than are usually
attributed to similar activities among human service and professional
organizations (White, 1972).
Burton Clark (1972:363-66) supports this distinction between the
interorganizational and the organizational or "bureaucratic" patterns
of activity.

By comparing some of their characteristics, he illus-

trates the contribution of a more interorganizational focus.

Decision-

rnaking within an organization regarding basic goals and policies, for
instance, is rather deliberate and purposeful; in fact, organizational
structure and hierarchy are presumably designed "rationally" to
support such activity.

By contrast, the transactions between organi-

zations are much less formally and overtly determined.

In addition,

an organization's standards of work can be deliberately set, such as
through inspections or work codes.

Standards between organizations,

however, are usually more indirectly or rnanipulatively established,
such as through according prestige, marketplace transactions, or
legal precedents (see Perrow, 1961) ~
Like Litwak and Hylton, Clark gives particular attention to the
lack of centralized authority in the interorganizational arena.
responsibilities are more

emerge~t

than delegated, more

agreed upon.than vertically designated.

Here

horizon~~lly

Although accountability may

be contractually bound, there is nevertheless a voluntary and nego-

9

tiated character to the transactions.
Yet these writers recognize that organizations do engage in
collaborative relations with each other, and indeed that these interactions can take a variety of forms.

In fact, Clark advocates research

in developing a theory of confederative organization or "organizati.onal
alliance."

He specifically urges a focus upon different authority

relations, including how organizations can unite their efforts "without
the authority of formal hierarchy and employee status" (Clark, 1972:
363).

A Typology of Interorganizational Fields - Prospects
Roland Warren (1967) synthesizes Clark's reconunendations with
Emery and Trist 's (1965) notion of "causal texture'' as the basis for
his typology of interorganizational "fields."

Warren proposed that

the contexts of organizations shape and influence their interactions.
"The concept of interorganizational field is based on the observation
that the interaction between two organizations is affected, in part at
least, by the nature of the organizational pattern or network within
which they find themselves (Warren, 1967).

His particular focus was

upon the patterns that could affect the integration or coordination of
activities of different organizations.

For example, relationships can

be mediated by various "structures," such as by laws, adjudicating

Il
11

bodies, or other organizations, and the organizations involved can
respond depending upon the type of mediative arrangement.
Warren delineated a typology; of four types of fields.

These

include the unitary, federative, coalitional, and social choice fields.
Each field is defined by a particular clustering of six interorganiza-

..............
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tional dimensions.

These are:

the relation of units to an inclusive

goal; locus of inclusive decision-making; locus of authority;
structural provisions for division of labor; commitment to a leadership subsystem; and prescribed collectivity orientation of units
(1971: 184-188) .

The unitary field most closely approximates the structures of a
complex organization and is exemplified by a county's health or welfare department.

Its units are hierarchically organized so as to

facilitate central decision-making.

The units work towards designated

goals under a prescribed division of labor.

Moreover, a relatively

high "corrunitment" by the units towards the central leadership is
often insured by legal arrangements.
The federative field, as found in a council of service agencies,
also features some formal authority organized to achieve certain goals,
although ultimately the federation depends on the assent of its constituent organizations.

The participating organizations have more

autonomy than in a unitary field, and maintain their own charters and
goals which frequently encompass more than just their relations with
the federation.

There is some designated leadership, including formal

staff, which supervises decision-making and insures communication between the units.

However, the units themselves have some control

regarding the extent of authority of this leadership, and their
autonomy includes a voice over the division of labor among the agencies.
There is a moderate degree of collectivity orientation and corrunitment
to the leadership.
The coalitional field features a group of organizations collab-

11

orating more or less closely to achieve singular goals, such as community organizations impermanently banding together to ward off proposed
highways or urban renewal projects.

Decision-making is much more ad

hoc, usually with no formal designation of staff or central authority.
The units are predominantly concerned with their own goals and exercise
much autonomy in their participation, but are oriented toward the
collectivity and its leaders, and a possible loose division of labor,
but only insofar as the particular objective is concerned.
Finally, the social choice field, which is best exemplified by
the marketplace metaphor, features the autonomous, individuallyoriented behavior of a sector or cluster of organizations.

Their

participation in this arena can entail discordant goals, although
there can be broad legal and normative boundaries regulating their
interaction.

Since participation in this arena often entails discor-

dant goals, planning or coordinated efforts between organizations proceed at a much smaller scale relative to the other fields.
Warren's differentiation of interorganizational fields was
derived from two related but distinct concerns.

First, emanating from

his research on the community and on what he terms "community decision
organizations," he was interested in the applied prospects for "concerted" community planning and service provision.

Accordingly, he does

not extend his typology to the larger political or economic "field

of

events" (see Emery and Trist, 1965); instead, it was limited to
differentiating the more immediate contextual dimensions of interaction
between organizations.

Here his stated concern was how a community

"satisfies" the different values represented by its different organiza-
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tions.
His second interest, and the one of more concern to this paper,
was on generating theory and research.

For example, he asserts certain

·basic propositions about the nature and effects of interorganizational
fields.

"The concept of interorganizational field is based on the

.observation that the interaction between two organizations is affected,
in part at least, by the nature of the organizational pattern or network within which they find themselves." (Warren, 1971:180)
Similarly, he speculates that the shifts between these four fields
"can relate different types of actors in new modes of interaction"
(1971:181; emphasis not in the original).
If we look broadly at this schema, it becomes evident that Warren
is offering dual propositions.

First, the conditions for interorgani-

zational relations can be separated into identifiable, coherent clusters
of dimensions which vary

tog~ther

and in an ordinal direction.

Second,

each "cluster" constitutes a distinctive contingency for shaping
relations between organizations.

Interactions themselves can be changed

by the field in which they occur.
1

I
I

l
I
I
I
I

Moreover, support can be found for both of these notions.

Re-

garding the first, both Litwak (1970) and Reid (1969; 1964) differentiated between situations of "unmediated" coordination, where as in the
social choice field, two or more agencies interact through their own
efforts without the intervention or direct regulation of another agency
which would be "mediated" coordination similar to a federation or unitary context.

Regarding the second suggestion, Aldrich (1976) found in

a study of manpower agencies and employment services that the manipula-

13

tion of authority relations--a key dimension in Warren's typology-does have an effect, including more intense interaction and more imbalance of referrals.

Hall and Clark (1975) also observe that the

authority of a legal mandate is important, for it affects the nature
and degree of exchange between agencies.
The implication of Warren's suggestions is that interorganiza'

tional theory must be constructed with explicit consideration for the
field of interaction.

The salience or effects of a variable can

differ from field to field.

For example, the process of exchange be-

tween organizations can be highly visible in a social choice, or
unmediated context (Levine and White, 1961).

However, exchange may be

much less conspicuous, even inoperative, where relationships are
legally established, as with some unitary contexts.
If different interorganizational concepts can be shown to vary
in their applicability between fields, interorganizational theory
must accommodate these developments.

If patterns can be discerned

regarding which of these concepts vary, the evidence for rethinking
interorganizational theory becomes even clearer.

Indeed, the

following chapter constructs a typology for distinguishing between
patterns of relationships which may vary.
If the possibilities can be found, at the least, greater
attention will be necessary for specifying the scope conditions of
propositions.

Eventually more encompassing models can be derived which

incorporate differences between contexts of interaction.

However,

preliminary to these ends, certain difficulties can be noted with the
interorganizational field typology which provide additional direction

14

for deriving a model.
The Interorganizational Field - Problems

Unfortunately, Warren does not elaborate upon these ramifications
of his typology.

The theory construction possibilities just discussed

are implicit and not explicit in his writing.

First, no justifications

are offered that the dimensions of his typology are definitive or
exhaustive.

Similarly, he hedges on whether the dimensions must

necessarily vary together to define a context.

Thus, which field a

cluster of organizations should be classified under is nebulous when,
for example, they manifest some commitment towards a collectivity or
collusion but have no division of labor or other structural characteristics of a federation.
Warren himself

observe~

other ambiguities.

The unit of analysis,

or field, may be difficult to discern operationally.

Any given con-

text refers not simply to all organizations in a locality but to a
definable cluster of organizations.

Thus, the respective "community

decision organizations" upon which Warren focuses can themselves be
nuclei for their own (frequently unitary) interorganizational fields,
yet when interacting with each other they manifest the characteristics
of a coalition or social choice field.
A more formidable problem involves specifying what phenomena
these contexts affect.

Although he suggests that these fields "can

relate different types of actors in new modes of interaction," he
does not specify what these modes are.

Instead, the fields are

distinctive simply because their aggregate effects are different.
Finally, the typology suffers from a static conceptualization.

~

..

!

1
I
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The nature of the causal factors remains nebulous.

No mention is made

of interorganizational processes or of the development or institutionalization of a field over time.

Ironically, the term "field" itself

was borrowed from Mannheim (as referenced in Emery and Trist, 1965),
all of whom emphasized social change and environmental fluctuations
as germane to analyzing relations between organizations.
Given these considerations the interorganizational field schema
requires further theoretical clarification.

As it stands it is a

typology and not a model, and thus it cannot be "tested" in a strict,
explanatory sense.

We have noted its implicit propositions regarding,

first, the dimensions of interorganizational fields, and second, the
varying-effects of different contexts.

However, both the nature and

consequences of these effects must be specified if a model is to
emerge.

Predictive utility requires the specification of the causal

elements.
However, if these contextual effects can be specified, the
notion of interorganizational fields bears salvaging.

Indirectly,

Warren is offering a critique of models which fail to consider the
effects of interorganizational contexts.

Because it differentiates

between contexts, his typology is pertinent to the issues previously
discussed, namely, distinguishing levels of analysis and building
upon other theories of relations between organizations.

It would have

greater utility if it could classify and examine interorganizational
phenomena.
In other words, we want to explore what these contextual effects
areby discerning

thos~

phenomena to which a model of interorganizational

16

fields is relevant.

We will not elaborate upon Warren's second

proposition about the relevance of the dimensions of these fields.

To

do so would require a comparative study across a variety of contexts.
Instead we will examine one group of organizations which approximates
Warren's criteria of a federation.
The next section constructs a classification scheme for exploring
and elaborating upon the interorganizational field typology.

An

integration of perspectives in a literature has produced four theoretical subareas.

Through a case study of a social service federation,

the relevance of Warren's typology to these sub-areas can be empirically examined.

CHAPTER II
APPROACHES TO INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
This chapter reviews the interorganizational literature in order
to cull prevalent but diverse propositions about relations between organizations.
reti~ally

With the selection of these kinds of propositions, a theo-

more complete and rigorous assessment of any differences be-

tween interorganizational fields is possible.

These propositions can

then be empirically examined to ferret out which phenomena are most
affected by the context of the relationships.
Although interorganizational relations have been conceptualized
in various ways (see Tropman, 1974; Marrett,1971), a large portion of
the literature can be subsumed under two approaches. 3 Perhaps more
precisely regarded as units of analysis, between them they parsimoniously capture dominant orientations in interorganizational theory.
The first is organization-centered and emphasizes the characteristics
of organizations as resource seeking and as maintaining technologies
which yield particular outputs.

Given these characteristics organiza-

tions attempt to adapt to (and change) their environment (see Thompson,
1967).

The second is relational and focuses upon a group or cluster

3
A third unit of analysis can be noted which focuses more exclusively upon the characteristics of organizational environments. Thus,
Emery and Trist (_1965) and Terreberry (1968) discuss the evolution of
the causal texture of environments, Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) discuss
the "natural selection" model of environments, and Benson (1975) considers the political economy as a broad context for interorganizational
networks. This approach will not be integrated into this discussion.

't

18

of organizations.

It is concerned primarily with the structure and

the linkage between organizations (see Litwak, 1970; and Morrissey,
Horan, and Rieker, 1975).
This chapter indicates how these approaches overlap in substantive
matters.

In fact, the intersection of their dimensions potentially

represents a demarcation of four subareas which taken together represent a significant portion of the literature.

Although the two

approaches sometimes differ in analysis of interorganizational phenomena, their integration in this manner may assist in building a model of
interorganizational fields by sorting out differences in contextual
effects.

That is, the typology which results from integrating the

organizational-centered and relational approaches may facilitate
providing explanations regarding why the field or context affects
interaction.
The Organization-Centered Approach
This tack takes as its unit of analysis the organization itself.
Its focus is upon how the environment of the organization can impose
itself as a contingency or constraint upon the organization's
activities.

More specifically, this approach extends the open systems

theory on complex organizations to construct a picture of interorganizational relations more or less as input-output activities (see
Morrissey, Horan, and Rieker, 1975; also, Warren, 1971:173; Aldrich,
1972a, and Dill, 1962 and 1958).

Thompson, who articulates this

approach most systematically (1967:1-10), begins with the proposal that
organizations attempt to maintain a "rational" structure, that is, a
structure calculated to achieve certain goals and "produce results"
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C.1967:1).

Assuming this, we first discuss general characteristics of

the interaction of organizations and environments and next note two
dimensions central to this interaction.
Thompson asserted that it is "uncertainty" which constitutes a
major threat to organizational rationaiity.

Specifically, the

organization's environment presents itself as a basic source of this
uncertainty (Thompson, 1967:1).

In this vein Aldrich (1972a)listed

seven aspects of organizational environments which can have an impact
upon the functioning of the organization.

These included:

stability,

or degree of turnover among elements in the environment (such as with
raw materials or other organizations); homogeneity, or degree of
similarity between the elements of the population dealt with; and
environmental "capacity," or the extent of resources available with
an organization's domain.
Each of these seven aspects can affect organizational performance.
A stable environment allows the organization to establish a more
Gentralized structure (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967;
Aiken and Hage, 1968; Simpson and Gulley, 1962).
I

Note, however, that

I

the more fixed the structure of the organization,- the more susceptible

I

environment, which in the case of service organizations includes the

'

it is to fluctuations in the environment.

Similarly, a homogeneous

characteristics of clients, can facilitate the development of a

I

standardized treatment or output technology (Aldrich, 1972b; Litwak and

I

Hylton, 1962).

Finally, the more

resourc~s

in the environment, the

more alternatives are available to the organization in achieving its
goals, which in turn affects the necessity for interacting with other
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organizations (Levine and White, 1961; Levine, White and Vlasak, 1972).
In response to a problematic environment, an organization has at
least two alternatives for action.

First, there is the modification

of organizational goals, or "goal-setting" (Thompson and McEwen, (1958),
as perhaps in response to changing markets, domains, or even as a result
of successes in achieving past goals.

Second, organizations can modify

their structure so as to buffer their technology against the environment (Thompson, 1967).

Thus, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) found that a

greater degree of departmental differentiation and autonomy under
circumstances of rapid environmental flux was correlated with organizatioanl "success."
These responses to uncertainty can be better understood by probing
two particular dimensions of organizations.
have some kind of technology.

First, they tYI?ically

This concept broadly includes the

mechanisms, procedures, and expertise involved in producing a particular outcome.

For human service organizations these outcomes can vary

from resocializing clients to providing welfare checks to "peopleprocessing" (Hasenfeld, 1972).

Thus, the technology for these outcomes

includes the procedures for conducting therapy groups, the certification procedures of welfare organizations, and the "professional judgment" and expertise involved in referring clients.
The second dimension is that of the resources required by the
organization· to conduct its business satisfactorily.

We are using the

concept ·of resources here in a broad sense to include also certain
intangible and qualitative aspects, such as the organization's
prestige (Clark, 1972) or the information required to yield results or
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upgrade its techno:ogy (Aldrich, 1972b; Reid> 1969:177).

Thus,

besides money and material, the resources dimension encompasses the
notion of organizational "domain," or its legitimate sphere of
activity as consented to by the public and other organizations
(Levine and White,

19~1; Braito, Paulson, and Klonglon, 1972). 4

For our purposes both technology and resources are vitally and
inevitably linked to interorganizational relations.

Regarding re-

sources, for example, the goals of a heal th agency require the acquisition of the clients and labor services (input) necessary to fulfill
its output functions (see Thompson, 1967:16).

However, it can

"seldom carry out even these (functions) without, to some extent at
least, cooperating and establishing relationships with other agencies
in the health and welfare world" (Levine, White, and Paul, 1963:165).
Thus, Warren, observes that an organization is typically concerned
with preserving or even expanding its domain (Warren, Rose, and
Bergunder, 1974; see also Parsons, as referenced in Thompson, 1967:10).
One interorganizational means of obtaining these various resources
is through "exchange" (Levine and White, 1961; Tropman, 1974), which
can be defined as a process of reciprocally linking with other organi4
warren (1971:201) includes in the concept of domain both
the technological and resource dimensions, focusing more upon these as
organizational prerequisites. However, the usage here is restricted so
as to be more consistent with the usual meaning of the term denoting
a negotiation process between organizations over the activities which
they can legitimately conduct.
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zations expressly to acquire resources.

5

Levine and White describe

various aspects of exchange relations, including the substances or
resources possibly involved and the status of the negotiations, such

as informal versus contractual exchanges.

Also important is the

"direction" of the transaction, which can be reciprocal (elements flow
from one organization in return for elements from the other) or joint
(where elements "flow from two organizations acting in unison toward
a third" 1961:355).
As outlined by Levine and White, exchange can also include
transactions of tangible goods for resources less easily assessed,
such as local prestige and a long-term domain.

This characteristic

of exchange renders the concept difficult to measure or to distinguish
from power phenomena.

Another consequence is that there can be a

discrepancy in the benefits which two organizations have gained through
a transaction.

For example, the amount of resources already controlled

by the organizations makes relative any comparison of gain or loss
·between them, as Litwak (1970) cogently· points out.
5

Finally, this

Levine and White state that organizations desire to preserve
autonomy by not entering into relationships, but that exchange in some
way is usually unavoidable given that organizations operate under conditions of scarcity of resources (see also Klonglan,Paulson, and Rogers (1972) .. Litwak (1970) takes issue with this "scarcity hypothesis,"
maintaining the converse: organizations with more resources will be
more likely (~p to a point) to enter into exchange relations since they
have the requisite resources with which to begin bargaining (see also
Melchar and Adamek, 1975). Since the agencies which are studied in
this paper are already engaged to some extent in a federative network
of relations, we will not examine specifically why or how these particular service agencies entered into relations. Thus, we will .avoid the
broad proposition that these resources are 11 necessary" for organizational funding.
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comparison must be gauged over time, as the exchange affects the
balance of later transactions.

6

By implication, an important feature of exchange relations is

that they typically entail some costs to the organization (Reid, 1969).
The general proposition here is that the rewards of the transaction
must equal and preferably outweigh the costs and problems which the
association entails.

Two particular types of costs, which are inter-

related, can be noted.
First, routinized interorganizational exchanges often involve
"resource dependency" (Blau, 1964; Aldrich, 1976).

This dependency

stems from a lack of alternatives in obtaining resources.

"An organiza-

tion is dependent on some element of its task environment (1) in proportion to the organization's need for resources or perfonnance which
that element can provide and (2) in inverse proportion to the ability of
other elements to provide the same resource or performance"(Thompson,
1967:30).

Thus, dependency places the organization in a potentially

uncertain environment, one which is less favorable to organizational
control (Aldrich, 1972a and 1972b).

Moreover, this dependency can

occur in both input and output domains, as when an organization finds
it difficult to entice enough clients or cannot locate a market for its
goods.

Thus, to establish a domain, inasmuch as this process depends

on organizations in the task environment, an organization must offer
6
one criticism with the exchange concept, particularly as initially formulated, was that it focused·too exclusively upon the··
inception of interorganizational relations; or the balance of gain and
loss at a single point in time, rather than upon what followed the
initial transaction or how this balance could be redefined through
later transactions.
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something (Braito, Paulson and Klonglon, 1972).
A simultaneous cost of exchange is that the organizations involved tend (.especially when very dependent on the relationship) to
forego autonomy (Levine, White and Paul, 1963; Klonglon, Paulson, and
Rogers, l972) .

.Autonomy. is broad1y defined as organizational

self-direction which is not contingent upon other groups.

A generally

accepted proposition in the literature is that organizations desire
to maximize their autonomy (Gouldner, 1959).

However, some autonomy

is sacrificed when, under conditions of dependency, an organization is
restricted in establishing or

modifying its goals (Thompson and McEwen,

.

For example, autonomy is necessary to maintain the viability

1958).

of organizational technology; to "place boundaries around those
activities which if left to the task environment would be crucial contingencies" (Thompson, 1967:50).
Thus, we return to the second dimension of organizations which
affects their interorganizational relations.

An

o~ganization's

technology, including.the procedures and expertise utilized in producing outputs, in various ways comes to be interwoven with interorganizational relations.

First, as previously noted, an efficient

technology requires some buffering from environmental constraints and
hazards.

Secondly, an organization's technology can importantly

influence the nature and extent of its relationships.

Thompson notes,

for instance, that the structure of the interdependencies between
I
I

organizations can stem from the admixture of their separate technologies

l.

(Thompson, 1967:54).' In turn, the type of

int~rdependence

type of consequent exchange and dependency relations. ·

affects the
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The type of technology supported by an organization can directly
influence relationships in other ways.

A large body of literature

supports the proposition that the nature of the technology corresponds
closely with the degree of task standardization, or changeability of
the element to be coordinated. (Perrow, 1972; Hage and Aiken, 1972;
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).

Standardization then becomes a contingency

for the linkage between organizations; in fact, Litwak lists it as one
of the most significant variables influencing the feasibility of
coordination schemes (Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Litwak and Meyer,
1968;

Litwak, 1970).

He

(1970:152) posits that "extremely non-

standardized situations will be best managed by primary-group type
linkages, while extremely standardized situations will be handled
most effectively by linkages which consist of written rules."
In short, technology helps to differentiate types of organizations and their structures (Perrow, 1972; Azumi, 1972:99).

One obvious

distinction is between "technical production organizations and human
service organizations" (Demone and Harshbarger, 1975 provide a
comparison).

White treats some of these differences at length:

Integration of the profit-making system is achieved through
the linkage of specific dyads of organizations in terms of
reciprocal needs and demands. Even though the "system" is
pluralistic, it thereby becomes integrated. The vital point
is that in this process individual decision-makers adjust or
modify their allocations or activities to confonn to the
requirements of decision-makers in other collectivities
(9rganizations). The resulting complementarity of the
activities of dyads of organizations produced system integration. (J972:35).
White goes on to note that among profit-seeking organizations, contracts
and monetary exchange facilitate the coordination of relations.
In contrast, money is much less often used to expedite the flow
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of resources among health and welfare organizations.

An important

corollary of this difference is that this along with the particular
technology of human service organizations makes the evaluation of
their performance much more problematic.

One consequence for public

policy is that it is more difficult to hold non-profit rather than
profit organizations accountable for what they do or do not accomplish
(?ee Gilbert and Specht, 1974). 7
The difficulties of patterned interaction between human service
organizations are thus comparable to a barter situation.

"It is pre-

cisely because the needs of both the two participating parties must be
fulfilled by a single exchange that an integrated and rational system
of exchange does not evolve" (Levine, White and Vlasak, 1972).
Accordingly, "When the profit criterion cannot be applied, it becomes
more difficult to define precisely what an organization is seeking to
accomplish and how well it is doing it, and for whom" (Warren, Rose and
Bergunder, 1974:7).
services:

Zald (1974) notes other

dilelll~as

of integrating

"though . . . a service agency could acquire clients from

other.· agencies,. . . its managers frequently are accountable to
fulfill their organizational goals and ideology, and face a constituency
to reinforce these functions."
One final, and significant, technological trait of human service

1!

I
~

7 rronically, moves to coerce agencies to become more accountable
can further the tendency to select "good" clients, that is clients who
are more s.erviceable and thus simul taneous.ly are less of a drain on
agency resources and are more likely to be presentable as a public
statistic of organizational success (Levine and White, 1961).
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organizations is that their "raw materials"--clients--can act back
upon the organization.

Thus, the welfare system has in the past decade

experienced the unionization of its clients, at times with consequent

modifications in organizational policy.

It is this interaction between

organization and client that Lefton (1975:171) suggests is a crucial
variable.
The Relational Approach
The organization-centered perspective views the characteristics
of interorganizational associations as emanating from the propensities
of an organization's resource needs and technological characteristics.
It views these associations from the vantage of a single organization.
In contrast, the relational approach asserts that with an aggregate of interacting organizations, the characteristics of the relationships themselves become an appropriate unit of analysis (Benson, 1975).

8

That is, viewing these interactions simply as extension of an autonomous
unit, as influenced by intra-organizational characteristics, is
inadequate (Warren, 1972).

Instead, phenomena such as power or

resource dependence stem from characteristics of the context of
relationships.
The interorganizational field typology emanates from this
approach.

However, the typology and the relational approach have not

been adequately integrated, perhaps because neither offers a coherent
theory.

This section first outlines the general concern of the

8The concept of "organization-set" is a possible bridge between
the emphases of these two approaches. See Evan (1972) for a definition,
and Azumi (_1972) and Aldrich (1977) for an extension of this concept.
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relational approach with interdependence and second delineates two
dimensions which sharpen the focus of this approach.

Although it does

not necessarily compete with the organization-centered approach, it
does offer alternative explanations pertinent for distinguishing between the effects of different fields.
Early proponents of a relational approach asserted that understanding the conditions for stability, conflict and cooperation
requires a concept of "interdependence."

(See Litwak and Hylton, 1962).

Organizations are interdependent when they are affected by each other's
actions (Lauffer, 1974:266; Guetzkow, 1966).

For example, decisions

about which product to manufacture affects both suppliers and the competing organizations in that market.
However, the generality of this description is fraught with
theoretical ambiguities.

An elaboration of the numerous facets of

interdependence is necessary to reveal whether it contributes to interorganizational conceptualization.
First, any organization will have multiple interdependencies with
its environment.
al field.

It can be involved in more than one interorganization-

Differentiating· the variety of input and _output affiliations

of an organization begets multiple interdependencies.

In addition to

suppliers of resources and competitors for products, there are associations. for public relations and for providing auspices or funds
(Lauffer, 1974).

Simply the extent of extra-curricular associations

of its members or constituency can increase the organization's network
of interactions

(~ee

Zald, 1974; also, Mitchell, 1969).

Moreover, there

is a distinction between horizontal (local) and vertical (national)

l

29
ties (Warren, 1971).

Thus, many locally-based organizations, be they

churches, medical societies, or connnercial dealerships, subsist under
the sponsorship of a national affiliate.

Next, interdependence can be distinguished in terms of facilitative and competitive linkages (Litwak, 1970:161-173).

Facilitative

interdependence indicates that each organization can benefit from
collaborating with the other, as where both desire some resource
which the other controls.

Competitive interdependency, on the other

hand, denotes that the interaction is tinged with threats over
resources or markets, though through laws or ethical codes some lines
of cooperation are encouraged.

Facilitative interdependence is more

likely to occur within a federation of organizations; competition is
more likely to occur in a setting of social choice relationships.
Another approach to interdependence takes its origin from
Durkheim.

Explicit in the concepts of mechanical and organic

solidarity is a differentiation of interdependence.

The former indi-

cates interdependence based on "sameness" or mutuality, such as that
emanating from a common outside threat entailing a collective outcome
or common goal (Lauffer; 1974:267; Tropman, 1974:153; Mott, 1968).
Organic interdependence stems from organizations with different but
complementary needs with respect to their different resources or goals.
The central proposition linking most of these descriptions is
that the extent and quality _of the relations between organizations is
contingent upon the nature of their interdependence.

Thus, .if there

is no overlap between the goals and tasks of organizations, there is
little basis for interacting at all

~eid,

1969:177).

Under conditions
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of facilitative interdependence, however, coordination between agencies
can likely be encouraged through stressing certain modes of communication (Litwak, 1970:163).

Finally, interdependence estab-

lishes the conditions of conflict (Reid, 1969).

For example, White

(_1968) describes a case in which a conflict between a local health
agency was created when the pressures of its national sponsoring
organization catalyzed a rivalry between them.
Despite its contribution, however, there are certain theoretical
and methodological problems which remain with the concept of interdependence.

First, some above have defined interdependence in terms of

"resources" (_Lauffer, 1974) while others have emphasized its connection
with organizational "goals" (Reid, 1969; Tropman, 1974).

Here use of

the term seems correlated with how one has defined an "organization."
For example, Aldrich (1972a) characterizes interdependence in the context of the variety of resources which an organization typically
requires.

Reid (1969), in contrast, focuses on goals of the organi-

zation as defining the parameters of a conflictive, independent, or
cooperative linkage.
Such discrepancies harbor other difficulties.
interdependence is usually not delimited.

The scope of

Although applicability to

all interorganizational situations is sometimes affirmed, in fact its
use has primarily been explored in the context of "getting organizations. together," such as the conditions of the inception or initial
coordination of relations (see Reid, 1969; Hage, (1975).

Thu~,

as

Hall (.1972) notes, the c.ondi tions for relations which are already
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institutionalized have been. left unattended by researchers. 9
Next, there are problems with noting the duration of interdependence.

Over time, and indirectly, most organizations could be con-

sidered interdependent relative to the breadth of the analyst's concern, though Litwak (1970:147) does attempt to confine usage more to
the "immediate" context of interaction.
Similarly, no "scale" exists for measuring the degree of interdependency between organizations.

Its vagueness glimmers in Litwak's

(1970) use of the quasi-concept "partial interdependence."

Thus, its

utility as an independent variable, like the use of the global variable
"social," becomes rather contingent upon recognizing other factors.
The slippage of this concept is evident in examining an article by
Aiken and Hage

(1958)on interdependence and organizational structure.

At the beginning of the article the concept interdependence refers
specifically to relations between organizations, but later it is
spoken of as a characteristic of an organization.
Therefore, to rescue it from these ambiguities, the relational
approach also can be more adequately described by delineating two
dimensions, structure and linkage.

The structural dimension refers to

morphological arrangements between organizations.

It includes the

9The "scarcity hypothesis" previously mentioned is based, for
example, on the inception of interorganizational relations. For recent
evidence which seems to counter this hypothesis, see Warren, (1972).
Also, in his study of a "coordinating council" of health and welfare
agencies,. Mott (_1968 :85) observes that it was the four larger, more
powerful agencies which had the most to gain or to lose, which interacted the most; the smaller agencies, on the other hand, played a less
significant role in the proceedings.
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administrative positioning between organizations and those factors such
as resources, goals and tasks which affect these positions.

The

linkage dimension includes the quality or characteristics of the
relationships.

Thus included is the frequency, standardization, and

reciprocity of the interaction (see Marrett, 1971).
Both dimensions share characteristics similar to interdependence.
However, they adequately subswne and clarify the types of interdependence while also encompassing other relational characteristics, particularly communication, which are at most implicit with the concept
of interdependence.
Both dimensions intersect with concepts already discussed under
the organization-environment approach, but do so with an emphasis on
relational qualities of interaction.

Under the structural dimension

organizational autonomy, for example, can be placed in perspective
as boundary (or position) maintenance activity (Aldrich, 1972a:283).
Here authority or power can refer to gatekeeper control over entry
and expulsion of members or clients ("resources").
But in a broader sense, autonomy can be calculated in relation
to the organization's network of associations.

'7o obtain resources,

an organization may have to give up its autonomy and enter into a
cooperative or amalgamative relationship with anothen organization.
It may have to give up autonomy in one relationship while retaining it
in anoth.er" (_Frey, 1973: 10).

In this way an organization can, for

example, expand its domain, and therefore its autonomy, through its
relationships (_see Azurnf, 1972; Thompson, 1967).

Put another way, as

Frey shows, there is no necessary correlation between organizational
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control over resources and-its dependence upon the environment.

In

short, autonomy is not simply the inverse of interdependence, nor is
it isolation from interaction (for a contrary view see Guetzkow, 1966).
Similarly, an understanding of resource dependency is broadened
when viewed through structural lenses, for an organization's alternatives are exercised through its position in a network of relations
Crropman, 1974:156).

As Benson succinctly states this proposal for

human service agencies, "where network organizations are engaged in
multiple, differentiated services to clients, an organization at the
center of referral, i.e., one to which all or many clients must be
referred, may gain power over those at the periphery.

This occurs

because centrality makes an organization crucial to the resource
acquisition of other agencies." (Benson, 1975).

In other words,

interorganization "power" is not simply the amount of resources which
an organization owns; rather power accrues to position within a network.
The structural dimension also intersects with the more technological aspects of relationships, especially the division of labor
among organizations.

This includes both the kind of tasks undertaken

and the mechanics of efficient production (see Litwak,
1970).

Regarding the latter, for example, a task hierarchy between

organizations can prescribe the sequencing of work flow and passage
of infonnation, but it is inevitably contingent upon the fulfillmentj'
of task responsibilities.

I

Most theorists appear to assert that the '

more this division of labor is so

spe~ified,

dependence and stability of the network.
view, see Pandy, 1961:318).

the greater the inter-

(.Reid~

1969; for an alternative
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The nature of tasks which an organization undertakes, in turn,
requires that it establish its task domain.

This negotiation can be

more or less problematic depending upon, for example, the goals of the
other organizations.

Complementary goals can facilitate a stable

basis for organizational transaction (Evan, 1972; Aiken and Hage, 1968;
Reid, 1969).
The linkage dimension focuses more specifically upon the features
and substance of the relationship itself.

First, it intersects with

an organization's technology in that the type of task is inevitably
related to the characteristics of linkages (Litwak and Hylton, 1962).
As previously discussed, the nature of the communication required can
affect interorganizational

patt~rns;

more non-routine cases may need

greater face-to-face, idiosyncratic coordiation (see also Hage and
Aiken, 1972) .
Second, the linkage dimension can also refine an understanding
of "resources."

First, it would seem that interorganizational re-

lations develop a normative basis just as do interpersonal relations;
in fact, Pondy (1967) lists norms as a basis for interdependence (see
also Aiken and Alford, 1970; and Guetzkow, 1966).

Warren's concept of

"institutionalized thought structure" (1974: 22-23) is pertinent here,
for it implies that over time certain implicit rules or justifications
hecome built up, forming a background for interaction.

His preliminary

research indicates that this normative structure "serves to reduce
uncertainty· to control lab le dimensions, to minimize contest, .to resist
change, and to assure organizational viability" (1972:157).

Indeed,

similar research by Rose (1973) details how organizations can appeal
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to this normative order.

His study of community action agencies

documented the process by which the goals of encroaching organizations
can be coopted as they become assimilated into the network of connnunity
agencies.
In a related manner, this intersection between linkage characteristics and resources suggests a reconsideration of "exchange" relationships.

Exchange often implies a somewhat tenuous type of barter re-

quiring an ongoing, reciprocal resettlement of terms (Levine, White,
and Vlasak, 1972).
associations.

It is thereby affected by the normative element of

However, this meaning of exchange is not germane to the

structural dimension.

It does not encompass the more routinized, even

mechanical transactions 1which often occur between organizations.
this respect, Hall

(1972)

In

states that interactions which are legally

required or which are highly formalized may not require barter or
bargaining, especially once a "precedent" for interaction is established.
Examining Interorganizational Fields:

A Typology and Hypotheses

The substantive overlap between these two approaches should be
apparent.

The intersection of their dimensions results in a typology

of four distinct activity areas as depicted in Figure 1.

These cells

can be labeled to organize their comparison across interorganizational
fields.

Cell A can be termed the transactional subarea and represents

the inters.ection of the linkage and resource dimensions.

It thereby

encompasses both the relational nature of res.ources, including their
normative characteristics, and the processes of acquiring and exchanging resources..
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Relational Approach:
Structural
Properties

Linkage
Properties
Organization
Centered
Approach:

Resources

A. Transactional

B. Managerial

Technology

C. Connnunication

D. Division of
Labor

Figure 1.

Four subareas of interorganizational relations.

Cell B represents what we can call the managerial subarea.

It

likewise features the resource dimension as it intersects with the
structure of relationships.

It includes the managerial strategies

which organizations use to protect their autonomy and to establish
their position in the interorganizational network.
Next, a combination of the linkage and technological dimensions
yields cell C, as broadly categorized by "communication."

This cell

concerns those kinds of linkage characteristics, such as standardization of task and coordination through inter-agency conferences, which
bear upon accomplishing a goal.
Finally, cell D,which can be labeled the division of labor subarea, is created by the technological and structural dimensions.

At

focus here is the mesh of the respective goals of the participating
organizations and its interaction with. the administrative "positioning"
of organizations to achieve (more or less) common goals.
This typology can be useful in constructing a model of interorganizational fields.

First, by demarcating these subareas it facili-

tates probing the nature of any contextual effects between fields.
Empirical exploration with a case study can be less selective or arbitrary because the typology encompasses much of the literature on
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relations between organizations.
Second, by integrating these two approaches, alternative
hypotheses about the effects of interorganizational contexts can be
germinated.
The relational approach suggests that organizations "exist and
take their form within an interorganizational context" (Warren,
1972), while a focus upon organizational characteristics helps differentiate the nature of the interdependencies which can emerge (Thompson,
1967).

Because they are more precisely units of analysis and not

mutually exclusive "theories," an examination of their content areas
I.

I

I

can suggest where conceptual ties lie.
From this literature review hypotheses can be extracted which
represent dominant lines of thought for each subarea.

These hypotheses

are paraphrased from key articles; each has been proposed or implied in
at least two sources.
HYPOTHESIS 1: THE TRANSACTIONAL SUBAREA
The larger the amounts of resources at stake in the relationships between organizations, the more the transactions will be
characterized by reciprocity. (Levine and White, 1961;
Marrett, 1971).
HYPOTHESIS 2: THE MANAGERIAL SUBAREA
The more dependent Organization A is upon the resources of
Organization B, the more Organization A seeks to develop (input and output) relationships with organizations C, D, and/or
E. (Aldrich., 1976; Thompson, 196 7) .

HYPOTHESIS 3:

THE COM\1UNICATION SUBAREA
Characteristics of th~ p·roductton process determine those
forms of inte~organizational communication which will be most
effective. (~itwak~ 1970; Lawrence and Lors.ch_, ·1967).
HYPOTHESIS 4: THE DIVISION OF LABOR SUBAREA
The. greater the (facilitative) interdependency of relationships, the greater the stability of the transactions. (Litwak,
1970; Reid, 1969; Hage, 1975).
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These four hypotheses will guide our case study of a social
service federation.

They were chosen first, because they are prevalent

in the literature, and second, because they capture the diversity of
interorganizational phenomena by integrating the relational and
organization-centered approaches.

In other words, between them the

hypotheses·permit a broad investigation of interorganizational fields.
Because they differentiate many aspects of interorganizational relations, the hypotheses can facilitate the specification of the effects
of different fields or contexts.

In short, if the predicted relation-

ships are not borne out empirically, the assertion of contextual
differences takes on greater credence.
Contextual Effects of Federations:

Alternative Conceptualizations

However, simply to find invalid the four hypotheses just
delineated is not necessarily a significant advance.

Although such

findings would indicate the need for additional theory and research,
the implications would be largely residual.

Rather, alternative

conceptualizations are necessary to detect any contextual effects for
this federation.

Though relatively little of the interorganizational

literature has probed the differences between fields, there is a
modicum of support for alternative hypotheses.

These alternatives can

be briefly sketched.
First, regarding the reciprocity hypothesis, various reasons
have been suggested why exchange processes might be less prominent in
a federation.

Direct exchange between two agencies may simply not be

necessary for interaction.

Exchange formulations seem particularly

relevant concerning the instigation of relationships, but may be less

39

important for an ongoing relationship or where the relationship is
mandated by law (Melchar and Adamek, 1975; Hall and Clark, 1975).

Here

calculation by representatives of an organization of whether to initiate

the relationship becomes less problematic.
Instead, in a federation "rational" calculation of rewards and
costs of any one relationship is encased in overall outcomes of
participation.

The gain from participation can be less immediate or

An

tangible than exchanges in a social choice field (Davidson, 1976).

agency may receive few direct benefits from a particular relationship
but may endure it because inclusion in the federation requires it.
The hypothesis about resource dependency might also be affected
by the federative context.

As with reciprocity, the calculation of

dependency for an organization within a federation becomes more complex because all organizations must be considered at once.

The

agencies in the federation become alternatives for relationships.

This

calculation is more complex because in this case the administrative
component can mediate ·the importance of dependency.

For both of these

reasons--the more alternative relationships present and the mediation
of power--the federation can provide a source of environmental
stability (Pfeffer and Leong, 1977).
Regarding the hypothesis about the nature of the production proce&s and communication within the federation, an alternative formulation is that the federation can facilitate the production process
through. its. division of labor and overall increased communication.
this w.ay interagency·procedures can become

mor~

In

defined and patterned,

th.erehy lessening the importance of standardization.
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Finally, interdependency can in some contexts be detrimental to
the stability of relationships.

Though a division of labor defines

the pattern of relations, various people point out that interdependence

can become too rigorous, too inflexible to permit adaptation to changing
internal or external circumstances (Gouldner, 1959; Pondy, 1967;
Aldrich, 1977).

This may especially be the case where transactions

between agencies are rather unstandardized.
In sum, in this chapter we have extracted two approaches and four
hypotheses prevalent in the interorganizational literature.

We have

also formulated alternative conceptualizations regarding why these
hypotheses might apply to some contexts but not adequately account for
behavior within a federative field.

This literature review is prelimi-

nary to an empirical examination of a federation which can at once
function as a critique of this literature and as a probe for contextual
effects.

CHAPTER III
THE FEDERATION OF SERVICE AGENCIES
This chapter introduces the federation of social service
agencies selected for this study.

We describe characteristics of the

"sample" of these organizations and specify the criteria of selecting
them for study.

We will also justify the applicability of their

relationship for the interorganizational field level of analysis.
A Multiorganizational Service Project
The focus of the federative umbrella was a two-year service
project and its network of inter-agency relations.

The agencies in-

volved were participants in a local and state-supported attempt in a
large metropolitan community in the Pacific Northwest to coordinate
the delivery of particular services.

This project was actually a

two year demonstration project designed in conjunction with federal
agencies to test whether local agencies could effectively coordinate on
such a project with minimal administration.

With some exceptions these

agencies had not maintained extensive relationships with each other
prior to the project, and indeed some agencies had existed for only a
few years or months.

However, though this project itself was slated

for a two year tenure, the agencies involved knew that there was a
likely prospect of continued government funding and that the level of
funding could depend upon the effectiveness of this demonstration project.
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The designated clientele, or "target population," of these efforts
were those elderly perceived as having proolems of sufficient severity
as to threaten their independent living.

The broader service goal

was actually to deliver and expedite available community services which
assisted the ability of these elderly to live in the community. lO
Approximately 400 clients a month were provided these services by project agencies

alone.

Of the organizations affiliated in any manner with this project,
nine agencies, and the design or "system" of relationships between
them, comprise the focus of this study.

Each of these, and its

function within the federation, will now be briefly discussed.
The first organization to be discussed is the "administrative
component" of the project.

Adhering ultimately to policies established

by a board of directors and the local and state commissions on aging,
this agency and its project director were responsible for managing
project coordination and smoothing the day-to-day ruffles of service
delivery.

The agency also promoted project goals in the larger

community, acting as a liaison especially to other services for the
elderly.
Next, an agency which can be entitled "protective services" was

assigned an assortment of liaison services for clients in need of
counseling, psychiatric, or medical assistance.
mental health

department~

Housed in the county

it was composed at various times in the

project's history ofrfrom three to six social workers and service aides
1

~his overview is obtained from the project's "First Annual Report," as prepared by the evaluation component of the project.

,:
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who operated closely with other community organizations.
The project's "legal component" worked predominantly as a consultant to protect the legal interests of clients and represent them
in various official matters.

Affiliated with a local legal aid

agency, this component consisted

of~a

lawyer, her staff, and some

volunteer and consultation assistance.
The project also featured the delivery of more immediate, tangible services.

Its "homemaker component," a wing of a locally well-

known family counseling agency, provided housekeeping and personal home
care for clients, and assisted as well with their "case planning."
This component included a team of homemakers, a supervisor and a social
worker.
Direct services were also provided by the "nutrition component."
This was an independent agency which, by sponsoring dining sites
across the city, both established facilities for congregate dining and
actually delivered meals to the homes of immobilized clients.
Finally, four separate organizations functioned under the title
of "referral component."

Geographically distributed in different

sections of the city, the responsibilities of these organizations varied
more markedly during the project's tenure.

Generally, however, the

duties of the paraprofessionals at these agencies included locating
eligihle clients, determining their particular service needs for
appropriate referral, and insuring the completion of their referrals.
Moreover~

at each of these organizations transportation resources were

stationed (particularly during the first project year) to assist
clients in meeting referrals and other appointments.
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A brief appraisal of the role of the administrative component
on the interagency scheme is pertinent at this point.
readily reveals its "mediating" effects.

An examination

Although the administrative

head of the project's coordination was unavoidably encumbered,
particularly during the first operating year, with broader planning
and community organization activities, he nevertheless devoted substantial time to general supervision and to meeting with the contracted
agencies.

Other administrative personnel had more specialized respon-

sibilities, including supervision of referral agency workers and estab-

I

lishing the procedures for the project's intake of clients.

I

people also worked closely with the evaluation component of the

I
I
l
I

project to formulate a standardized set of criteria for defining

l

!

I
I

These

client characteristics and thereby restricting entry into the arena of
services.
The interviews with officials from the contracted agencies indicate the extent to which this administrative component demarcated
interagency roles.

All but one of the agency administrators inter-

viewed felt that, except for a few contrary instances, there had been
adequate communication with them about their position in the project.
There were a few more negative reflections about the communication of
ongoing project developments, but again a clear majority of officials
considered administrative feedback to be adequate.

Moreover, the

administrative component had an indirect effect by encouraging and
s.pons.oring conferences of all types between agencies.
Finally, project records verify that the administrative component
(in conjunction with authorization from state and local granting
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delegations) worked to establish the basic interorganizationalreferral design of the project.

Interview data revealed that when

various service exigencies in the original design proved unwie ldly, this component assisted in facilitating a less problematic
scheme.

These interviews also revealed that when the sheer bulk of

clients threatened to bog down interagency processes, this component
was instrumental in restricting client intake and clarifying which
agencies might at any time have "responsibility" for a client.
Therefore, we may conclude that these interorganizational relations

~"mediated"

by this coordinating component.

That is, it

did have an effect in shaping the structure of relationships, and it
was a significant protagonist in altering the patterns of authority
and domain between agencies.
The associations between these nine organizations constitute
by Warren's typology a definably
ships.

federative cluster of interrelation-

There is an authority structure which upholds a division of

labor to achieve certain common goals.

Moreover, the participating

organizations did affirm the necessity of some joint commitment to
serve their elderly clientele.
At the same time these organizations did have considerable
autonomy, as was made evident in interviews with various agency
officials regarding their role in the shift in the federation's
service design.

Even though three agencies--one from

the referral 1 and one each from the legal artd the protective service
component~--were

hired to participate in the project, all agencies

featured organizational characteristics, as this term is usually used,
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regardless of their frequently small size.

That is, each had distinc-

tive positions and perspectives within the federation, and was capable
of acting independently of the other components.

Some were affiliated

with larger organizations, but in no way were they branches of each
other.
Besides correspondence with the previously described characteristics of a federation, certain other criteria were used in delimiting
this focal set of organizations.

First, only organizations contracted

for service activity or direct administration were selected for study.
Although various community agencies participated frequently with
project tasks, those other than the nine had no formal service roles.
Thereby excluded are personnel minimally contracted for liaison with
other agencies as well as the project's evaluation component, which
performed an indirect information function.

For similar reasons, the

state and the local commissions on aging are also not examined.
In sum, these nine organizations and their relationships constitute a federative arrangement.

As such it can justifiably be compared

with the hypotheses listed in the previous chapter.

Thus this case

study provides an opportunity for examining the importance of Warren's
concept of interorganizational fields.
There are, however, certain influencing factors which we should
consider in our analysis.

Besides the normative, non-profit character-

istics, many of these organizations are rather small, and this variable
of size can differentiate certain interactional qualities (Simpson and
Gulley, 1962).

One might anticipate, for instance, that interorganiza-

tional awareness and the "primary group" characteristics of interaction

l
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would be heightened by this

facto~.

Moreover, the size of the central

network itself is rather small and this would have an impact upon the
nature of the coordinating devices feasible (Litwak and Hylton, 1962).

Organizational "age" is another factor which must be considered.
Some posit that the length of an organization's operation is related
to its characteristics.

The literature is inconclusive on this point,

however; Rosengren (1968) suggests that new, action-oriented organizations are less likely to feel a functional need to engage in inter'

organizational relations, but Zald (1974) feels that such organizations
would be less committed to a particular community network and therefore
would be less constricted by older ties.

Regarding this point, records

and interviews indicated few associations between these nine organizations prior tothe project's planning stages.

Although they may have

interacted with other community organizations, they appeared not to
have a history of predisposing problems or affinities among each
other.
In sum, we have·described a network of service organizations,
chosen as our case study, which fits the characteristics of a federation.

We can now describe the methodology for analyzing whether the

four hypotheses delineated in the previous chapter apply to this service federation.

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the methodology utilized in the examination
of the federation of service agencies.

After noting general character-

istics of the case study method, we detail the data used in this study
and the process of collecting them.

Finally, some of the "operationali-

zations" used in ferreting through this information are listed, including the criteria for assessing hypotheses about interorganizational
relations within federations.
The Case Study Method:

Limitations and Possibilities

The case study method usually involves blending a number of information sources to acquire a more complete picture of a unitary phenomenon.

The "breadth of data" usually obtained is valuable for probing

different aspects of this unit (Goode and Hatt, 1952).

For example,

the case study is especially helpful in investigating process and
developmental variables.

In particular it is useful for forming typolo-

gies and clarifying the dimensions and measurement of concepts related
to the phenomenon.
The case study in this instance offers certain advantages for
interorganizational research.

It readily captures the systemic or net.-

work flavor of relationships.

Its reportage of these relationships can

be more inclusive than an aggregate or stnnmary statistics.

In any case,

few such measures are provided by the literature, and their development
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is not within the scope of this study.
Though the limitations of the case study for testing a theory are
often bemoaned, guidelines can be followed to enhance its utility.
Campbell (1975) recently posed this issue in considering the potential
for rejecting an hypothesis.

First, he observed that case studies do

have this potential if they systematically describe the parameters of
the case and the concepts being examined.

An "antagonistic" approach

toward hypotheses can be adopted by deliberately attempting to falsify
them or find competing explanations.
Second, Campbell reasoned that the degrees of freedom available
through a case study can be increased.
avoided.

Post hoc "tests" can be

Multiple dimensions of the model can be tested.

Confidence

in data is increased if multiple sources of information are available,
while conclusions are bolstered if multiple measures support the
hypotheses.

If Campbell's suggestions are heeded, this approach can be

valuable for studying a federation of social service relationships.
Data Collection
The data on this federation have been obtained from a variety of
sources.

Certain documents, including the minutes of meetings and

monthly reports, are complete through the project's service delivery
tenure.

Other reports assist in sketching out incidents in the pro-

ject's planning period.

Also, monthly case monitoring records are

available for the first year; these detail on an agency-by-agency basis
the aggregate of referrals received and sent and the number of client
activities accomplished.

These sources are supplemented by the author's

personal experience with the project's second operating year while an

so
employee of its evaluation component.
A major source of information was obtained through a series of
interviews.

Over thirty interview sessions were conducted, over a two

month period, with a representative from each of the nine contacted
organizations being interviewed at least twice during this period.
Other staff from most of the agencies were also interviewed.

In

addition, interviews were conducted with representatives from ten
non-contracted agencies.

These agencies had participated with project

organizations in some service delivery capacity and were more or less
familiar with its goals.
The interviews with representatives from the non-contracted
agencies, however, required a different sampling approach.

It was

decided·for reasons of economy that only agencies who had interacted
with agencies in the project should be included.
"snowball sample" was chosen.

Therefore, a modified

Workers from the federation agencies

were asked which organizations they had come in contact with during
the project's operation.

A list which represented a continuum of these

organizations "most interacted with" was derived from the frequencies

I

of their responses, and from different points on this range ten organi-

I

zations were chosen.

I
I

One methodological issue often facing the sampling of organizational personnel is whether a survey-sample approach or the use of
"key informants" yields more valid and reliable data (Pennings, 1973).
The problems were generally circumvented in this study by the small
size and number of participating organizations.

Almost all personnel

contracted by the project (not including those participating as clerical

1
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or voluntary assistance) were sampled.
Moreover, this sample took into consideration the accounts of
representatives of different levels of the organization (see Hage and
Aiken, 1972, and Hall and Clark, 1975, on this issue).

In virtually

all of the organizations interviews were held with those of the contracted personnel of managerial positions within the organization.
Additional interview sessions were conducted with many "line" personnel.
All interviews covered a variety of project areas.

The emphasis

generally was an informant approach, but one which consistently ineluded questions over the following subjects:

the object and frequency

:

of relations with other agencies, including which were contacted tile
IllQ:St; problematic relations, such as lack of cooperation or~
~-

l

cemmuntc·a.non; ..how aeti-v:i!-ies such as meeti:ngs facilitated more

!.

effective relations; that person's role in the project, and how it
have-C1ranged; and

finallf'.o~~er

~ay

services and activities in which their

organization was engaged.
The interview protocol, however, was intentionally not kept
rigorous nor were the possible responses often closed.

Many project

activities and incidents were known prior to the sessions; therefore,
a sensitivity to that person's impressions about these affairs, and to
his organization's per$pectives on them, was deemed to be more appropriate for an exploratory study than a standardized protocol.
fol~owing

a more

pr~bing

format, for example, several significant

interorganizational incidents unknown to project administrators
discovered.

By

were

With this format the length of the sessions varied, but

most were between ninety minutes and two hours.
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Some remarks are in order regarding the validity of each of these
data sources.

The information on the official reports was viewed as

useful especially for listing and locating events in time.

Besides

this chronology official reports often serve to corroborate or dispute
information provided through personal accounts.
assessed discriminately.

However, they were

Since official reports were usually compiled

by project administrators both to inform and inspire, these accounts
were tinged with an optimistic flavor.

A certain skepticism should be

maintained in perceiving as "data" information gathered however
unobtrusively from "official" records of transactions.
Next, monitoring reports are also cautiously approached.

Although

appearing to provide the kind of "hard" data which sociologists so
appreciate, their information occasionally is faulty.

Particularly in

the beginning phases of the project, and to some extent whenever
system changes were initiated, the items of the reports were somewhat
unstandardized.

What was considered a "referral," for example, varied

slightly among agencies.
Other aspects of the validity of the interviews can be discussed.
First, they were held at the end of the project's tenure, which
presumably allowed relational patterns to establish themselves over
time.

The thorn of relying upon people's memories of past events is

assuaged in part through information in the project records.

However,

that respondent's perception or impression of past events as "real" is
in any case an important type of data.
These interviews were generally conducted as part of an evaluation
project.

However, this potentially biasing factor is partially dis-
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counted on several grounds.

Since the project in fact in most cases

had less than a month to continue at the time of these interviews, the
respondents may have had less at stake in an impending evaluation report.

Also, they were told that the report would be written in such a

way as to insure the anonymity of their responses.

Finally, they

were asked to be as candid as time would permit, and most appeared
quite eager to be interviewed for the opportunity to "speak their mind"
on the project.
Data Analysis
The "findings" of a case study are constructions from
and making conceptually coherent a diversity of data.

~ntegrating

Campbell (1975)

warns that given its limitations for generalization, an emphasis on
detail and specification of facts for a case study can be unwarranted.
Nevertheless, the ideal of reliability is jeopardized by idiosyncratic
interpretations or vaguely specified indicators of concepts.

These

potential pitfalls can be at least partially filled by matching some
of the indicators of the hypotheses to be examined with operationalizations from the data.

In so doing more systematic future replications

and descriptive studies might be facilitated.
The hypothesis concerning the transactional subarea focused on
reciprocity, which refers to the mutual flow of resources between
agencies (Marrett, 1971:93).
staff, and money.

Resources can include clients, information,

Thus, by examining monitoring records we can detect
. I

whether the flow of clients actually occurred according to the project's
design.

Interviews with agency personnel can reveal any "returns" of

resources.

Reciprocity can also refer to mutual participation in

!
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decision-making; here we can examine the extent to which agency actions
altered or molded the balance of these resource flows.
Next, resource dependency refers to a lack of alternatives in
input or output relationships and the desire of agencies to maximize
alternatives.

By examining the background information for each of the

organizations we can hypothesize propensities to initiate alternative
relationships, such as with non-contracted agencies.

With referral

data we can also examine discrepancies in organizational contact with
other project agencies.
The hypothesis for the conununication subarea emphasizes the
relationship of characteristics of the "production process" with
interorganizational conununication within the federation.

One techno-

logical facet is standardization, or the changeability of the elements
or tasks to be coordinated (Litwak, 1970; ses also Perrow, 1972).

By

distinguishing between these tasks, we can correlate them with the
opinions of workers for which type of conununication is most preferable
and effective.
Finally, the division of labor subarea involves the effects of
interdependence, which can be measured by the extent of role
specialization and the interagency referral design for the project as
a whole.

The relationship to the "stability" of relationships can be

assessed through the extent of conflict and opinions of agency administrators.
Although each of these hypotheses has its own focus of content,
overall the analysis probes the effects of the federation "as a whole"
on relationships between organizations.

This includes identifying the
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nature of the effects, noting which agents if any were directly responsible for them (such as the administrative component), and estimating how important these effects were.

In other words, can the

behavior of the agencies be understood without reference to the
federation?

For example, with the hypotheses about dependence, reci-

procity, and "production processes" (when data are available) dyads of
relationships can be examined to determine if patterns are as predicted.
Since this is a case study of a relatively small cluster of
organizations any statistical approximation of the strength of relationships between variables is at best crude.

Because most of the

hypotheses have a number of indicators, some arbitrary "weighing" of
the evidence is inevitable.

However, if effects of the federative con-

text can be discerned, then conclusions can be made more firmly.
Next, the forms of relationships between the variables of the
hypotheses are important.

If interorganizational relations were

examined over a broad range of contexts, such as all four "fields" of
interaction, the relationship could for example be linear, curvilinear,
or involve "interaction effects" between fields.

By analyzing only one

field the "total variance" to be accounted for is limited.

If a large

sample of only federations were to be analyzed, the range for variables
might be limited, and thus the surmised form of the relationships
could be misleading.

Therefore, we ultimately want to explore by

extrapolating across interorganizational fields.
accrue with only one case available.

Obvious limitations

Nevertheless, as mentioned, much

of the research on these hypotheses has been on social choice fields,
thereby making comparisons more feasible.
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In these ways general conclusions can be drawn about differences
between interorganizational fields and the contribution which this
level of analysis makes in explaining relationships between organizations.

If federative influence can be distinguished in at least two

of the four hypotheses, then tentative credence can be given to the
importance of contexts.

If these effects can be found for a majority

of the hypotheses, this would be even stronger indication of support
for considering this level of analysis.

CHAPTER V
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF HYPOTHESES
This chapter considers four hypotheses culled from the literature
on interorganizational relationships by empirically examining phenomena
from a federation of service agencies.
the methodological

~trictures

This case study is guided by

specified in the preceding chapter.

The·

hypotheses are segregated by their corresponding subareas to provide
additional·continuity and coherence to their evaluation.

A brief

review of operationalizations is presented for each hypothesis in
order to facilitate more valid comparisons across interorganizational
fields.

Data analysis and interpretations of each are offered in turn.

Based upon the analysis of these hypotheses, the remainder of
the chapter offers a more inclusive assessment .of this level of
analysis.

Consequences of participation in a federation are reviewed

to discern the nature of any contextual effects.

The implications for

Warren's interorganizational field typology are pursued further in the
concluding chapter.
The Transactional Subarea
HYPOTHESIS 1: The larger the amounts of resources at stake
in a relationship between organizations, the more likely the
transactions will be characterized by reciprocity.
This subarea is created by the juncture of the resource and linkage dimensions of interorganizations and the characteristics of the
connections between them.

I

~- ..~·

Here the interorganizational linkages and
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their attributes are viewed as affecting, or being affected by, the
organization's stake in the resources involved.

Accordingly, the

hypothesis for the· transactional subarea involves the direction of
resource flow within the federation.
Variations of this general assertion about reciprocity appear in
much of the li.ter.ature on interorganizational relations.

Reciprocity

indicates that there is in some form a mutual flow of resources between
the-parties involved (Marrett, 1972:93).

Moreover, the benefits of

these transactions are distributed on something akin to a parity basis,
although the rewards can possibly be quite dissimilar and intangible
(Litwak, 1970).
However, assessments differ somewhat between analysts as to how
important reciprocity is to a relationship.

Levine, White, and Vlasak

(1972) are most adamant that it is an essential ingredient to relationships, at times implying that relationships between non-profit agencies
are similar to a "primitive barter situation," where "the needs of
both the two participating parties must be fulfilled by a single
exchange."

A less extreme version of this proposal is that represen-

tatives from organizations are more likely to desire to interact with
those agencies which can satisfy resource needs directly.

A more

minimal form of reciprocity is that a direct exchange is not necessary,
but that some indirect exchange, such as through linkage with a third
party, can satisfy the demands of those involved (see Litwak,
1970) ..

The alternative to all of this, of course, is that re.ciproci ty
~

is not a necessary factor for interaction.
Measuring the degree of reciprocity is not necessarily straight- .
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forward.

Therefore, we will differentiate sectors of activity.

Marrett (1971) has noted at least two aspects of transactions which
can involve reciprocity:

first, the extent to which the conditions of

exchange are mutually agreed upon (voluntary), and second, the actual
flow or transfer of elements between agencies.
Regarding making decisions on the conditions of exchange, we can
distinguish between an agency's exercising influence in specific
transactions with other agencies - at the operational level - and its
negotiating with the federation as a whole regarding its role in the
broader design of service delivery.
federation was voluntary, of course.

The decision to participate in the
However, the agencies had to

forget some voice regarding the basic roles which they were to _play in
the project.

The origins of the project featured a "task force" of

local agencies which in innumerable

in~eragency

conferences shaped the

shell of the project's interagency scheme of services.
conferences in

some~-

Though these

not all - cases included input from the agencies

which were to participate directly in services, basic plans were
ratified by this task force, with some alterations by the project
coordinator.
The final distinctive changes in the interagency design also
were not predominantly in the hands of the agencies.

Rather, the

project coordinator was responsible for reducing the number of clients
eligible for a

cert~in

"caseload" of clients.

To be sure, the communi-

cation with and approval by different agencies was necessary, but
again, the initiation of the pattern of service relationships was not
really determined by mutual agreement between the agencies.

Thus,
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there appeared to be some discrepancy in reciprocity of influence in
formally outlining the basic modes of service provision and interorganizational transactions.
However, considering reciprocity of influence at the operational
level of the project alters this picture somewhat.

We described in

Chapter Three how the exigencies of providing services forced some
informal, often crescive changes in these plans.

Although remnants of

the original design remained, the service agencies exercised influence
in important ways.

First, although unplanned and usually in response

to another agency's action, their initiatives altered the design by
making the referral process more decentralized.

Second, they fre-

quently negotiated directly between themselves the informal procedures
for referring and servicing clients, although the administration component often mediated these negotiations.

For instance, the referral

process was certainly not entirely unproblematic.

However, particu-

larly after the first six months of the project, this was as much a
process of knowing an agency's capacity and criteria for service as it
was a negotiation over authority.
Thus, the agencies over time did influence the development of
the project by establishing the expectations and responsibilities of
interaction.

For example, at the inception of the project, there was

for the service agencies ambiguity regarding how their actions were to
fit together.

As one person put it, it was necessary to be flexible,

sometimes even to wait until another agency (such as a referral agency)
had initiated a role for itself before establishing firm procedures of
its own.

Thus, sometimes relations between agencies featured certain

1
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idiosyncratic flavor.

However, it appeared that all of the contracted

agencies exercised influence in these negotiation processes, and not
just particular agencies who referred or who received clients.
In sum, procedures for relations between agencies were often
ad hoc and rarely formalized by mutual agreements.

However, in this

federation the necessity for establishing terms for daily operations of
service provision resulted in informal agreements.

These sometimes

simply emerged over time, as decisions were made by one agency in
response to decisions made in other agencies.

Nonetheless, negotiation

over the terms for interaction did occur, but it was often mediated or
even encouraged by members of the administrative component.
Thus, by this indicator we can reject the extreme "primitive
barter" version of the reciprocity hypothesis (Levine, White, and
Vlasak, 1972).

Instead, agencies did initiate and negotiate relation-

ships, but these were primarily at the operational level and were often
mediated in one way or another.
The second indicator of reciprocity regards the actual flow or
transfer of elements between agencies.

Reid (1964) lists many of these

elements, including transfer of information, of clients (referrals),
and of services.
First, the monitoring reports are useful here in indicating the
extent to which the general design of the project was implemented.

This

design called for the referral component to provide most of the "intake"
and referral services; clients would flow from these agencies to the
contracted and other community agencies.

Thus, this design did not

call for a very direct reciprocity or exchange between agencies and
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accordingly provides an adequate test of the hypothesis.

Its enact-

ment can be verified by noting from the monitoring records the percentage of referrals received from the referral agencies as opposed to
other agencies.
In turn, whatever the referral agencies received from these interagency efforts can be revealed through interviews with them.

The

interview data generally can reveal the extent to which reciprocity
existed in dyadic relationships.

Moreover, any reciprocity between

project agencies can be contrasted with those benefits mentioned in
interviews with non-contracted agencies.

The indicators thus involve,

first, whether an imbalance in exchanges occurred, and second, the
enthusiasm with which the organizations and workers responded to the
relationships.
Examination of the monitoring records indeed reveals that the
referral design was enacted.

Thus, for the first year at least,

clients were referred when necessary (and when services were available)
from the referral agencies to other contracted agencies.

This pattern

held for all three of the service agencies to other contracted
agencies.

This pattern held for all three of the service agencies

(referral data from the nutrition sites were inadequate):

seventy

percent of clients serviced by protective services were from contracted
referral agencies, as well as eighty percent of the homemaker clients,
and almost one hundred percent of the legal aid clients were from this
source.

(Other reasons for this variation between these agencies will

be discussed in the communication subarea.)
In contrast, the referral of clients usually did not flow in the
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opposite direction.

Contracted agencies sometimes did refer clients

back to a referral agency, but usually would curtail their responsibilities only after service delivery for that client
nated.

had been tenni-

Agencies generally preferred to take it upon themselves to

refer clients to other agencies, though this assertiveness diminished
somewhat over time.
Other resources can be involved in reciprocal transactions, however, including passage of information and providing services.

Based

upon interview data, we can note that information and other resources
sometimes did flow between agencies.

Only the protective services

agency explicitly mentioned that information as a resource was shared
with a referral agency, although some of the supervisors also considered their meetings valuable for this function.

The other

"exchange" noted between the agencies was more ongoing; it featured
the referral agencies sponsoring meal sites for the nutrition agency.
This arrangement appeared beneficial for both parties, since the
referral agencies received added community and client esteem in return
for some physical resources.
However, although there were these instances of reciprocity,
resources did not simply flow back to the referral agencies as a transaction for clients.

Rather, the agencies who most often noted that

there was information exchanged were the referral agencies, but this
exchange occurred
service providers.

am~ng

each other instead of with the other contracted

Moreover, other than these referral agencies, no

agencies mentioned exchange with more than one other contracted agency.
In short, some reciprocity did occur, but it was sporadic and did not
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apply to many of the resources passed between agencies.
Finally, the interviews regarding non-contracted agency relationships indicate that transactions out of the federation were generally
more reciprocal than those within the federation.

Of the six agencies

interviewed, all mentioned having some form of an exchange relationship.

The transactions generally were not based upon formal agree-

ments, and in some cases the non-contracted agencies had mentioned
exchanges with only one or two federated agencies.

However, some

larger organizations, such as the community health and welfare services,
reported relationships with all of the federated agencies.

The types

of resources which flowed in these relationships appeared similar to
relationships within the federation.
But an additional element which appears significant in examining
these non-contractual relations is the perception or value attached to
them.

Interviews with the workers from the federation indicate that

some form of exchange frequently facilitated a working r.elationship with
other agencies in the community.

As with relationships in the feder-

ation, it is difficult to assess "objectively" the balance of resource
flow in these transactions.

Nevertheless, the perceptions of the

transactions by federation agencies seemed different; it was almost as
though they were less routinized, and enthusiasm and value were
attributed to the transactions because they could not be taken for
granted.
This analysis of the transfer of resources within the federation
does not indicate much reciprocity in interagency transactions.

Based

upon referral information, interview data, and the contrast of the non-
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contractual relations, both objective and subjective indicators imply
a pattern of relations which ac.knowledged and affirmed the larger
collectivity of agencies.

The original·service impetus of federation

was sustained; apparently, the coordinative work succeeded in
loosening some of the everyday strictures of interagency reciprocity.
In sum, both these two

indicators~-establishing

the conditions

of exchange and the actual flow of resources--call the reciprocity
hypothesis into question.

Though traces of bargaining and exchange

can be found, a strict bartering form of reciprocity was certainly not
the norm.

Rather, the reciprocity which existed was more indirect,

informal, and extended over time than the hypothesis predicted.
Apparently the mediation of interagency relationships by the structure
and development of the federation was a significant factor in diminishing the importance of reciprocity.

Nevertheless, what reciprocity

did exist probably increased the overall stability of the project.
Thus, if this hypothesis were examined across all four interorganizational fields, it is likely that there are interaction effects
rather than a linear relationship between resources at stake and
reciprocity.

These interaction effects are probably due to greater

certainty of transactions coupled with the mediation by third parties.
Both of these are features of the larger context of interorganizational
relations.
The Managerial Subarea
In this subarea the structural and resource dimensions of interorganizational relationships intersect.

The structuring of relation-

ships includes the administration by an organization of its input and

I·

I
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output operations.

These involve the procedures for establishing or

avoiding the control or hierarchy between organizations.

The concern

of this administration lies with the resources which organizations can
utilize.

These resources, such as an organization's authority, domain,

and its more tangible assets, constitute a bargaining element in this
structuring of relations.

The hypothesis which follows is germane to

this concern with the utilization of resources in a federative context.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The more dependent Organization A is upon the
the resources of Organization B, the more it seeks to develop
(input or output) relationships with organizations C, D, and/or
E.
A social service organization which has access to a limited supply
of input or output relationships or resources typically recognizes that
its environment is uncertain.

In this kind of environment the organi-

zation's control over its position becomes much more tenuous, its
operations potentially vulnerable to other organizations.

Accordingly,

such organizations would desire at the minimum to maintain some alternatives in its interactions, and at the maximum to exercise power and
control over its environment.
This hypothesis has been proposed often by organizational theorists.
(See Thompson, 1967; Aldrich, 1972b; Tropman, 1974).

Some recent re-

search has supported it; see, for example, Aldrich's (1976) study of
employment service offices and social service agencies.

However, it is

necessary to supplement this line of thought by probing its application
in different interorganizational fields; it remains for us to see if
dependence is manifested similarly within a federation.
Resource "dependence" here is operationalized as a lack of alternatives in input or output relationships.

The issue is whether the
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agencies contracted by the project attempted to minimize their
dependencies by reserving alternative courses of action for themselves.
The analysis basically involves noting the extent to which these agencies
located and maintained working relationships other than with project
agencies.

This is accompanied by probing why the availability of these

resource alternatives were or were not important to the agencies.
A brief survey of the agencies reveals a varied set of resource
circumstances.

The task here involves scanning where the agency would

have been had it not participated within the project.

Of those in the

federation only one referral agency began operating with the inception
of the project and was funded almost entirely by it, although it rapidly
became assimilated into the connnunity.
each been active for a few years.

The other referral agencies had

Although they were fairly well en-

dowed with volunteers and connnunity·domain, with the depletion of
community action and local monies their statuses were clouded by some
uncertainty.

All but one had some sources of aid beyond involvement in

the project, but most felt some pinch when the project trimmed funds
the second year.
The service agencies generally featured somewhat less established
but more "professional" programs.
tective

Two of them, the legal and the pro-

services, were formed with the project's inception but within

the auspices of existing non-profit and state organizations, respectively.

Although their budgets emanated almost entirely from project funds,

th.eir employees were professional with marketable skills and therefore
they had a measure of autonomy.

The nutrition agency had also existed

for a short span of time, but it was rapidly expanding its operations

68

due to the sudden availability of federal funds.

Finally, the agency

which provided homemaker services featured the largest and probably
the most "established," diversified domain within the community,
although a significant portion of its budget too was composed of its
allotment from the project.
However, though sources of support varied, overall dependence on
the project for funding did not.

Referral agencies relied more upon

their integration into their localities and community funds whereas
the other agencies featured more marketable, professional services,
with less local competition for their services than was the case for
the referral agencies. ·However, despite glimmers of independence, all
depended extensively upon the project for organizational sustenance.
For example, all of the agencies received a· significant percentage of
their budgets--in most cases· from forty to sixty·percent--from the
project.

Other than the general difference·between referral .. and ser-

vice agencies, and the prospects of future·" federal funds for the
nutrition component, it is difficult to discern

appreciabl~

differences

of dependency of the agencies on the project.
The task now is to note if ·there were variations in the extent to
which these agencies seized linkages which maximized·their alternatives
to interacting with project agencies.
monitoring· reports are useful here.

The referral data found in the
Given their resource contexts,

the hypothesis would' lead us to expect· a generaUy high level of
interest for all project agencies irt ·diffusing their referral activity.
The strongest indicator of minimizing dependence is extensive referral
·activity with non-contracted agencies.

A weaker version would be
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diffusion of referral activity within the federation.

This interest

should involve a desire by agencies to accumulate resource alternatives
while maintaining ties with the federation.
The resource alternatives important here to the referral agencies
are their outputs, the agencies to which they send referrals.

As

Azumi ·(1972) posits, "when the organization has ... just one consumer
on the output side, then the organization's dependency on the agent is
maximized."

We will consider 16 possible cases:

each of the four

referral agencies could desire to lessen dependency in their relationships with each of the four service agencies.
Instead, the patterns of referrals to project and non-contracted
agencies confirm a more minimal or altered version of the resource
dependence hypothesis.
(~ot

On the one hand, the total number of referrals

including those to transportation services) to project services

increased for one referral agency, remained fairly stable for two others,
and decreased somewhat for the fourth agency.

On the other hand, al-

though it fluctuated more dramatically, the referral rate to non-contracted agencies increased over time distinctively for all but one of
the agencies.
However, examination of records indicates that generally these
non-contractual referrals are for services other than those provided by
project agencies.
referrals.

That is, these were not alternatives but additional

Al though pers.onnel from three of the referral agencies

mentioned during interviews that they cultivated

alte~ate

agencies on

/

which to

dep~nd,

the reasons given for these outlets generally involved

the need for more of a particular service.

In one case, an agency
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TABLE I
NUMBER OF CLIENTS (AGGREGATED IN 4-MONTH SPANS)
REFERRED TO SERVICE AGENCIES
BY REFERRAL AGENCIES
SeptemberDecember

JanuaryA£ril

Referral Agency #1

Homemaker (H)
Protective Services (P)
Legal Aid (L)
Nutrition (N)

32
44
39
91

37
42
24*
57*

Referral Agency #2

Homemaker
Protective Services
Legal Aid
Nutrition

25
19
20
24

20
23
29*
81*

Referral Agency #3

Homemaker
Protective Services
Legal Aid
Nutrition

7
17
7

3
7*
9
55*

Homemaker
Protective Services
Legal Aid
Nutrition

19
2
22

Referral Agency #4

77

38

24
1
9*
25*

*indicates at least a 20% addition or decline over time
expressed a desire not to make inappropriate referrals and thereby
antagonize a particular project agency.
A breakdown of these alternatives reveals a fairly broad distribution of resource seeking.

Two referral agencies mentioned sometimes

utilizing alternative agencies instead of two of the contracted services,
and another referral agency used one such source.

On the other hand,

two service agencies in two such relationships were the objects of this
circumvention, while another service agency was avoided by another
relationship.

The remaining service agency was apparently not avoided.

In sum, in only five of the sixteen possible referral patterns was there
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evidence of seeking alternative referral routes.

Moreover, this cir-

cumvention did not occur in a uniform pattern--at least four different
reasons for these routes were provided.
Other factors affected these referral patterns, however.

First,

the agencies were in fact encouraged by the administrative component
to utilize existing community resources, to expand their domains within the community, and this mandate if anything preceded the rise in noncontracted referrals occurring after the first few months of the project.

Although no strict boundaries were placed on relationships out-

side the federation, the stipulation was that this referral activity
should not impede operations of agencies within the federation.
Moreover, this move toward domain expansion by the agencies seemed
equally a result of the operational exigencies at hand.
occurred in two ways.

This push

First, since the project was relatively new each

referral agency experienced a rapidly growing clientele, yet experienced
a shortage of federated resources and agencies to deal with client
demands.

Therefore, both alternative and service outlets were con-

sidered imperative if they were to maintain their legitimacy.

Second,

the agencies were hardly aggressive in pursuing alternative directions
of referrals.

As noted, the reasons frequently cited for these actions

involved difficulties of linkage with particular project agencies,
including a desire by workers to avoid recurrent misunderstandings or,
in one case, simply the proximity problems of a service agency's location on the outskirts of the city.
Resource alternatives for output are one means to lessen
dependence; alternative sources of client input are another.

Here the
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focus is on all the referrals directed to the service agencies.

By

examining whether referrals originated from within the project or from
non-contracted agencies, we can discern tendencies to maintain ties
outside of project agencies.
Different patterns for the four agencies can be quickly observed.
For instance, the homemaker component was at the inception of the project probably the most "established" of the service agencies.

At first,

it accepted a large percentage of clients from non-contracted agencies,
for it already had a large number of ties outside the contracted network
of agencies.

However, over time its contacts with contracted agencies

increased while correspondingly the number of this kind of referral
decreased dramatically (from 31% in the first six months to barely 10%
in the second) by the end of the first year.
However, just the opposite occurred with the protective services
agency.

It

~as

a new unit with few community ties.

However, it was

composed almost entirely of professional workers who, through the nature
of their work, developed extensive ties with other non-contracted
agencies.

At the same time, as illustrated by fewer referrals, it inter-

acted somewhat less with the contracted agency network than homemaker
agency.

These tendencies are revealed in the increasing number of

referrals received from non-referral agencies:

from twenty percent in

the first six months to forty percent the second six months.

In short,

regarding the number of outside ties, this protective services agency
reveals a trend just the opposite of the homemaker agency.
The legal aid component was different from both of these.
though smaller in operation,

Al-

it was similar to protective services in

73

that is was a new unit dominated by professionals.

However, the data

indicate that, for the first year of the project, ninety-nine percent
of its referrals came from the project referral agencies, a pattern

clearly discrepant from the proposal. Again, the type of service
rendered appeared to set the interagency pace, for it was predominantly
the counsel of one lawyer to her clients.

In contrast to protective

services, there was accordingly much less urgency in obtaining exchanges
from other agencies.
The remaining service agency, the nutrition component, also
featured a distinctive referral pattern.
referred by project agencies.

Most of those served were

However, this agency found significant

nourishment in outside funds and during the second year of the project
received almost no project support.
ation had such outside support.

No other agency within the feder-

Yet the indication from interviews is

that most of its clients still were referred by project agencies.

Even

with little fiscal support from the project, this agency relied upon
and cooperated with it as much as any other agency.
This agency's action makes explicit a pattern more subtly exemplified by most other agencies, namely, that the federation as a whole,
as a collective of organizations (Azumi, 1972), was considered a resource with which agencies must deal.

Affiliation with it superseded

th.e need to maintain linkage with any particular _agency.

In this case,

the federation its.elf as a pattern of social organization supplied resource alternatives; thus dependence was mediated by the other interorganizational relationships available

thr~ugh

it.

That the federation

shapes this availability becomes evident when we consider that even
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though almost half the project agencies received considerably less
money during the second year, they too continued to cooperate with
project coordination.

Moreover, all but one administrator interviewed

expressed considerable desire to maintain linkage with it.

Since an

interest in formalizing relationships can be one means of minimizing
dependency by shoring up against uncertain environments (Aldrich, 1976),
this desire again affirms the significance of the federation.
In sum, these data indicate that a modification of the resource
dependency hypothesis must be considered.

Alternative referral sources

of inputs and outputs were sometimes important, but patterns here
correlated as much with characteristics of the tasks to be coordinated
as they did with linkages to resources.

Instead, it appears the

hypothesis must be revised to consider the nature of the interorganiza'tional field.

The agencies were interested in maintaining alternatives,

but this occurred more within the relationships of the federation than
with outside agencies.

In other words, when resource dependence was
?

a concern, the federation was an intervening variable which directed
or strongly affected any search for alternative relationships.·
The Communication Subarea
Coupling the technological dimension with the linkage dimension
results in a focus upon interorganizational collllllunication, or the types
of techniques involved in linking the efforts of functionally discrete
agencies.

Technology is a broad concept which encompasses the pro-

cedures and expertise involved in producing an output or delivering a
service.

For example, the preparation of meals by the nutrition agency

entails a very different set of procedures and problems than the
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idiosyncracies of deciding to which agency a client should be referred.
The hypothesis for this subarea is concerned with certain consequences
of this "production process" or service delivery for interagency relations within the service federation.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Characteristics of the production pro~ess
determine those forms of interorganizational communication
which will be most effective.
This hypothesis is derived from the broader assertion that the
forms of technology utilized for a talk will affect the ensuing
structure of interorganizational relationships (Litwak, 1970; Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967).

In this case the production process involves the

knowledge about and the methods of providing the various project services, while the forms of communication refer to arrangements and
procedures to coordinate interagency action.

The implication is that

the work process itself is an important independent variable that
inevitably steers which course of coordination is taken.
The objective of analysis is to discern if the federative context
alters or supersedes the effects of technology on communication between
the agencies.
able.

Two indicators of the influence of technology are avail-

First, a survey of differences in the characteristics of the

services provided by project agencies should allow us to find any
correlations with differences in their communication

p~tterns.

Inter-

views can reveal what types of interorganizational communication workers
feel are desirable

as well as their assessment of their work process.

Second, patterns of referral rejections over an eight-month span
of the first year of the project should also indicate the effects of
the production process.

If an agency's procedures for servicing a
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client vary to some extent with differences between clients, then we
can expect an increase in interagency misunderstandings regarding when
a clients is appropriately serviceable.

Thus, there should be a higher

rate of referral rejections for agencies whose criteria for accepting a
client varies extensively.

Further, the rejection percentage should

for these agencies remain consistently high or increase as the project
progresses.

With these data we can discern any contextual effects,

which could occur by increasing the importance of other variables
affecting coordination or by influencing the nature of the technology
itself.
Certain dimensions characterize the technologies of human service
agencies.

The "routineness" of the operation, which includes the com-

plexity or possible variety of client needs and the amount of knowledge
about how to treat them (Perrow, 1972), is a variable which can effect
an organization's structure and its consequent disposition to interact
with other organizations (Hage and Aiken, 1972).

One relevant aspect

of this routineness, for example, is how often the organization must
interact with other organizations to mediate or negotiate for a client's
situation as well as how problematic or unpredictable this process is
for the agency.

In a similar vein, Litwak (1970) argues that a crucial

contingency for interorganizational relationships is whether the
"events" or raw materials which an organization handles are standardized.
We can organize a composite of these factors as our mea.sure of
"standardization," which expresses the nature of the intra-organizational
technology that the agencies utilized in providing services.

Litwak

predicts that after controlling for certain conditions, such as a small
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number of organizations involved and a high awareness among them of the
need for coordination, the degree of standardization should determine
the level of intensity of interagency linkages most likely ·to be
utilized.

With low standardization he expects a high degree of inten-

sity, with more informal interagency communication, an emphasis on
joint staff meetings, and a

cert~in

"primary group intensity."

In con-

trast, a high degree of standardization should result in lower intensity by pennitting agencies to specify through general meetings the
rules and instructions on the circumstances and procedures of communication.

Between these extremes are instructional sessions or regularly

scheduled meetings which confront alterations or new contingencies in
interagency relations.
A survey of the work of the project organizations will allow us
to test these predictions by differentiating which agencies would be
most likely to want these types of interorganizational communication.
We must note that human service organizations often are biased toward
a human relations orientation which stresses primary group intensity as
"an essential part of their milieu" (Litwak, 1970; see also White,1972).
Such rhetoric was used often, for example, by workers from the referral
agencies.
However, the tasks of workers from referral agencies did feature
unstandardized qualities.

First, their tasks were not w.ell specified

at the start of the project, and their responsibilities were altered
more than for workers from the other

~gencies

project.

continuou~ly

They also had to negotiate

ships with other community agencies.

during the course of the
in informal relation-

Finally, they were staffed by

lI
I
I
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paraprofessionals who often did not have as much experience to exercise
the judgment called for by casework and referral activities.

Thus

their work overall was unstandardized.
The activities of the protective services agency were also unstandardized.

Although the workers were professionals, their cases

usually called for diagnosing a variety of personal needs and for displaying judgment regarding appropriate actions.

They too dealt with

unpredictable interorganizational relationships.
The legal aid component also featured some unstandardized responsibilities.

But although clients had a variety of needs, the actions

required to meet them were somewhat more routine, given the requisite
legal credentials for the task, than the practices of the protective
services agency.

A minority of cases did require substantial effort,

and some entailed legal interaction with other parties.
In contrast, the tasks of both the nutrition and homemaker
agencies were much more standardized.
frequently with other agencies.

Neither was required to interact

For both agencies, but particularly

the nutrition component, the variety of needs were much more circumscribed than for the other agencies.

Thus, less expertise was necessary

and appropriate actions were more easily diagnosed and delivered.
In sum, project agencies exhibited many levels of standardization
in delivering their respective services.

According to Litwak's

hypothesis they should utilize corresponding intensities in communication techniques and preferences.
Information on what types of meetings were preferred by workers
as most helpful was obtained through interviews.

Three general cate-

1

l

I

I
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j

gories were listed, including the general forums, instructional sessions

I

for learning how to respond to a general category of client problems,
and the idiosyncratic "staffings" for workers dealing with problems
regarding particular clients.

These categories form an ordinal ranking

of high, medium, and low interagency intensity.

Thus, the predicted

relationship is that high task standardization would be associated
with low interagency intensity.

However, deviations from expected

relationships must be assessed by the pattern of preferences, since
more than one category could be chosen.

In other words, an agency with

highly standardized activities might prefer a middle as well as low
level of intensity, but should not choose middle and high intensity.
With some exceptions, the indicators of task standardization and
interagency conununication techniques generally confirm these predictions.
Only two agencies,

includi~g

the nutrition component and one referral

agency, chose the general meetings as very helpful.

At the other end

of the pole, three of the referral agencies - the protective services
and the homemaker agencies - preferred the highly intensive staffings.
A tally of these preferences reveals that only the homemaker and one
referral agency deviated markedly from predictions.
Finally, half of the agencies indicated some preferences for the
intermediate category of interagency intensity, which included instructional sessions and regular meetings between supervisors.

Only two of

the five agencies with unstandardized technologies preferred this category, while two of the three agencies with standardized technologies
preferred it.
The general trend of referral rejections by three of the service

lI
I
I
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agencies during the middle eight months of the first year also indicates
the effects of the production process on interagency coordination,
though with some qualifications.

The prediction is first that the more

unstandardized technology would lead to a higher rate of referral rejections, and second, that this technology would feature a constant or
even increasing percentage of rejections through the project's tenure.
As was predicted from its "nonroutine" technology, the percentage of
rejections actually increased during this time from fifteen percent to
twenty-two percent (see Table II).

However, the overall percentage of

rejections was a moderate eighteen percent.
TABLE II
REFERRAL REJECTIONS FOR THREE PROJECT AGENCIES
DURING EIGHT MONTHS OF THE FIRST YEAR
Protective
Services

Homemaker
Agency

Legal
Aid

14

96

2

December-March

16

56

0

Total

30

152

2

August-November

93

100

56

December-March

71

82

87

164

182

143

Referrals Rejected:
August-November

Ref erred and Served

Total
Percentage Rejected
August-November

15%

96%

2%

December-March

22%

68%

0%

Total

18%

83%

1%

In contrast, the referral rejections by the homemaker agency are
not so easily interpreted.

Since it features a more standardized tech-

i

I

i

I
I
II
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nology than protective services, this agency should feature a lower and
declining percentage of rejections.

However, though the percentage does

decline this agency has a total rate of rejections of eighty-seven
percent, certainly much higher a percentage than protective services.
Some interpretation of these rejections comes from project records
which indicate that the homemaker agency not only had a higher volume
of clients but apparently less operating capacity.

By all accounts the

agency early in the project was overwhelmed with referrals.

Thus, the

rejection percentage declined from almost one hundred to sixty-eight
percent.
The third agency is the legal services agency, which also featured
a more standardized technology.
percent) of referral

reject~ons

Thus, its very low rate (overall, one
conforms to predicted patterns.

More-

over, to expedite coordination the legal agency held for the referral
workers a series of sessions devoted to identifying the most frequent
legal problems of clients which should be referred.
In sum, the patterns of rejections also indicate the importance
of the production process, though somewhat less conclusively than the
patterns of interagency communication.
As previously discussed, one other response regarding difficulties
of coordination is that they were "developmental."

This response re-

fers to viewing misunderstandings as "inevitable," especially at the
start.of such an intense, interorganizational effort, as well as when
adjustments must be made when the project or its agencies altered basic
procedures or service orientations.

Virtually every agency, including

the administration component, maintained such coordination problems

1

I
I
I
I
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are "bound to happen" over time but are nevertheless exceptions in the
overall interorganizational harmony.
The picture which corresponds with these comments about the project's development is encased in references to participation in it for
two years.

Most workers mentioned that the increased breadth of exper-

ience gained in interagency phenomena facilitated confronting the
coordination issues which frequently emerged.

For example, the lawyer

for the legal services attested to this experiential factor by notimg
the increase in "appropriate" referrals by referral workers.

The pro-

ject coordinator similarly stated that this enhanced interorganizational
judgment and·homemaker components, which by the end of the second project year rarely contended the appropriateness of referrals.

The

development of the project is indeed epitomized by the nutrition component, which by this time rarely needed to meet with other agencies
to accomplish its responsibilities.
Taken as a whole all these data confirm the importance of an
agency's technology in determining its interorganizational relations.
However, the federation as a context of interaction supplemented and
shaped these effects in significant ways.

First, the prospect of

continued participation in the federation meant that agencies generally
had to resolve problems of coordinating services.

Though the agencies

reserved the flexibility to avoid some issues, they were aware that a
level of detail in

arr~ngements

if the project was to continue.

and understandings had to be reached
This awareness was enhanced by the

administration component, which encouraged and mediated these ongoing
settlements.

J

I

I
I
'
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. Second, the sheer frequency of interaction quickened the pace of
inter-agency familiarization.

The high intensity of referrals and

other communications actually expedited becoming knowledgeable about

which referrals were appropriate or which cases called for workers
from other agencies.
Thus, it appears that regarding technology, the project functioned
as an intervening variable.

The federation functioned to close and

intensify the development of the interorganizational system.

Thus,

it provided the setting to shape, indeed possibly enhance, these effects
of technology.

For example, the greater frequency in handling particu-

lar problems was itself staged by the interorganizational context
(Perrow, 1972).

The complexity of factors affecting interorganizational

phenomena does not mask either the general importance of technology or
the specific effects of the federation.
The Division of Labor Subarea
This subarea focuses upon the interaction of the technological
and structural dimensions of interorganizational relationships, refleeting the literature's interest in how the tasks and goals of
different organizations merge to affect the production process (see
Thompson, 1967).

Many relationships are oriented towards producing

some specific output; the division of labor in this service federation
featured a rather elaborate strategy for organizing and sequencing its
coordination of se:rvice delivery.
the effects of these

effort~

In this section the existence and

are examined thro.ugh the· interdependence

and conflict which they.engendered.
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HYPOTHESIS 4: The greater the (facilitative) interdependency of relationships, the greater the stability of the
transactions.
Interdependency generally refers to an overlap of interests, to
an agency's taking the actions of other agencies into account when
planning its own operations (Hage, 1975).

The circumstances of inter-

dependence can vary extensively from two organizations being directly
dependent upon each other to their being mutually dependent upon a
third party, to a combination of these two contexts (Mott, 1968).

These

structural variations of interdependence between organizations can affeet the potential for stability and conflict (Mott, 1968; Reid, 1964).
One type of arrangement, one which is featured in the interorganizational design of this service federation, is facilitative interdependence,
where all parties can benefit to some extent from coordinating their
efforts.

Depending upon the structure of relationships, then, the

consequences of interdependence can be beneficial or threatening to
the input or output performances of organizations (Litwak, 1970).

Thus,

we would expect for this federation that a stable network of relationships would accompany a very interdependent structuring of relationships.
Interdependence includes various characteristics which affect
the operation of the project as a whole.

Relationships are more inter-

dependent when there is common usage of some service or facility,
when sequences of work or information flow are prescribed by task or
hierarchy, and when some consensus exists about joint activity (Pondy,
1967:318; also Thompson, 1974).

An important

~actor

is the extent of

functional specialization, including knowledge and execution of roles
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and tasks within the project (Litwak, 1970).

Indicators of these

characteristics revolve around the degree of centralization and
specialization achieved in the project.

Centralization is illustrated

in the project's referral designs as these were altered over time,
while specialization can be assessed through referral data.
Interviews with workers and administrators provided evidence of
consensus of agency stances toward joint activity.

These workers saw

themselves as participating in an interagency project which was more
inclusive than merely an agreement to refer clients to other organizations.

While their perspectives emanated from their organization's

interests and responsibilities, the workers nonetheless spoke of the
project as a coordinated endeavor.

This necessarily entailed a certain

compliance with the administrative component if project and agency
goals were to be accomplished.

In short, agency personnel conceived

of the project as a system which provided a design for service
delivery which could not be offered by a single agency.

The general

consensus on these issues formed a background for interdependent activity.
The administration utilized these views to develop a design for
referral which required a high degree of centralization.

The original

project referral design entailed the four referral agencies intaking
prospective recipients and then shuttling these along to a central referral post housed with the administrative component.

This central

referral post was to evaluate which referrals were actually qualified
clients and then to refer these to the appropriate agencies--whenever
these agencies had the capacity to provide the services.

In short, this

was a highly interdependent design; the behavior of any agency would

.,

I

I

I
I
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have ramifications for the other agencies.

I

This coordination scheme collapsed very quickly.

Obviously the

scheme gave the project's administrators more control over client
characteristics.

However, this structure robbed agency officials of

the autonomy of deciding whom they would refer and whom they would
serve.

Most important, the central referral post was quickly inundated

with prospective clients.

As a result, clients were not getting served,

and the referral agencies began bearing the external pressures of
client wrath.

Conflict and misunderstanding ensued over when and where

clients should be referred.
The second referral scheme was an ad hoc arrangement informally
implemented by the end of the first six weeks of the project.

It was

a much more decentralized scheme, though most referrals were still
supposed to flow from the referral agencies to appropriate services.
Data from the monitoring forms for this period indicate that this
interagency division of labor did generally occur:

almost 90% of all

intakes came from the referral agencies.
However, this scheme still featured facets of the original referral design.

Though less centralized, the scheme did not encourage

much direct reciprocation between agencies.

For example, relatively

little information exchange occurred beyond immediate servicing of a
client.
An important example of the type of interdependence fostered
through this design involved relationships with the transportation component.

This consisted of a van and a driver stationed at a referral

agency.

The result of this positioning was that the referral agencies
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had some discretion over who got rides, and when.
slowed the service process to some extent.

This arrangement

As a consequence, the

service agencies were dependent on the referral agencies to some extent
both for referrals and for access to transportation services.
this imbalance of access, and the lack of

immed~ate,

Given

reciprocal ties

for settling squabbles (except for common ties to the administrative
component), interagency conflict tended to escalate easily.
The third referral scheme, which was operationalized a little
over a year after the project's inception, was even more decentralized.
Transportation was made more accessible to the other service agencies.
Moreover, these service agencies were permitted to handle more intake
activities, thereby becoming less dependent on the referral agencies
for clients.

At the same time, the referral agencies had become more

proficient at utilizing whatever community resources existed, thereby
lessening the necessity for making demands upon the project agencies.
This third scheme emphasized that some agency should shoulder
responsibility for the client's welfare.

Accordingly, the agencies

gained some autonomy in accepting and referring clients.

Thus, there

was less specialization of function, more exchange of information,
fewer differences in interorganizational status, and somewhat more
reliance on non-contracted agencies.
Although this sequence of referral designs illustrates a decreasing degree of interdependence, other bases for interdependence
developed as experience

with the project increased.

Coordination re-

quired some familiarity with the circumstance of clients and procedures
of other organizations.

Learning and making "roles" within this system
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evidently requited a period of adjustment, especially given the limited
experience of agencies with interorganizational endeavors.

Thus,

understandings and expectations did develop regarding how agencies would
respond to events; interviews indicate, for example, that referral
workers became more skilled at identifying referrals which other
agencies would consider appropriate.
In sum, by these measures this service federation maintained a
moderately intense degree of interdependence.

Overall interdependence

did not increase; if anything it declined during the course of the project.

The hypothesis for this subsector would therefore be that the

stability of relationships decreases· as the level of interdependence
declines.
The "stability" of these arrangements, though somewhat more
difficult to measure, can be examined through consequences to project
agencies.

These include first, the degree of satisfaction of workers

and administrators with relationships.

Second, the converse of

stability can be noted by probing conflicts of interests between
agencies.

Data on these indicators come from interviews with agency

officials and project records.
However, though the level of interdependence declined, the
stability of the federation appeared to grow over time.

Interorganiza-

tional relations were by all accounts most problematic during the first
year of the project.

Interviews indicated that participants were least

s.atisfied with interagency arrangements during this period.

Indeed,

in an interview the head of the administration component somewhat
loosely described "coordination" during this period as breaking

~p

1
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interagency conflicts!

Project records verify the frequency of these

antagonisms.
Some of the tensions abated as the referral design was altered.
The more decentralized schemes facilitated more feedback between
agencies regarding clients.

With better information, more appropriate

referrals and services could be provided.

And with more autonomy for

decision-making, satisfaction and initiative gradually increased.
But the significant level of interdependence continued to have
some adverse effects on project stability.

In an interview the project

coordinator summarized these effects as system ambiguities and as system
capacity.

System ambiguities referred to misunderstanding, lack of

information and unclear division of labor between agencies.

The

increased flow of information resulting from alterations in the referral
design helped to articulate agency roles with the federation.

Of

course, these effects were in part a result of lack of interorganizational experience.

As previously discussed, understandings did

develop over time as agencies clarified their roles.
Problems with system capacity are easily traced to interdependence.
For example, the deluge of referrals during the first year indicated to
the administration component that ignoring an agency's capacity to
serve clients could disrupt the larger system of activity.

A majority

of workers interviewed agreed that an overall lack of resources within
the federation resulted in conflict over how to handle the demands that
thi£ volume of referrals created.

In short, the level of interdepen-

dence resulted in serious reverberations throughout the federation.
One important factor in these reverberations was the increasing
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number of relationships initiated with non-contracted agencies in the
community. First, these functioned to lessen the interdependence within
the federation by providing an outlet for serving the volume of clients.
Second, having relationships with non-contracted agencies increased
the alternatives which project agencies had.

Instead of having to work

with each other (due to the small number of organizations in the
federation) they could choose which agency was the most appropriate for
a client.

Moreover, agencies could more easily avoid relationships

which were troublesome, and several agencies remarked that they had
avoided conflicts in this way.
The availability of these alternatives has been termed "system
redundancy" (Landau, 1969).

The possibility of different routes for

clients functioned as "safety valves," reducing pressure on system
parts when obstacles to providing services loomed.

For example, at

first the referral agencies did not have many relationships with other
service agencies.

Thus, for example, when the homemaker agency reached

its capacity, the dearth of alternatives proved to be a source of conflict.
The relationships between interdependence and interorganizational
stability now become more clear.

A certain level of interdependence

apparently did support more stable relationships.

The design of the

project facilitated defining organizational responsibilities and client
characteristics.

Further, there were many indications that the division

of labor and affiliation with a publicized project strengthened desires
of personnel to stay with the project.
But the interdependence which can be planned in a federation

l
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allows more intensity, more centralization, than within the social
choice field.

Thus, the federation permits examining what in this

case appeared to be, the upper limits of a usually positive relationship between interdependence and stability.
ation the relationship

That is, for this feder-

was curvilinear; up to a point, interdependence

facilitated a harmonious system, but beyond that it became inefficient.
In short, interdependence within a system can be too "tight."
The importance of flexible alternatives and flow of information cannot
be ignored.

The development of relationships over time, the nature

of the technology utilized and the small number of organizations were
all important system contingencies.

Nevertheless, they do not mask

the aspects of the system ambivalence which interdependence contributed.
The Impact of the Federation on Interorganizational Relationships
Taken together these findings emphasize that relationships between organizations are significantly affected by context.

Interaction

effects were found for three out of four of the hypotheses; the predicted relationships did not adequately depict what occurred.

Since

there is evidence that all these hypotheses do hold for other interorganizational fields, their lack of support here clearly justifies
specifying and incorporating characteristics of this federative context
into a theoretical framework.
The variety of contributing factors. and their effects can be
noted.

Here the conditional nature of many relationships can be

emphasized.

Thus, the range of variables comprising the context can be

seen as interacting to form a distinct overall contingency for relationships between organizations.

To name other factors, the frequency of
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interactions, the number and size of organizations, and the alternatives
available were all network parameters which were interconnected to
affect organizational behavior.

When building a theory of federations

elaborate sets of hypotheses could be constructed to take the interaction of these parameters into account (for examples, see Litwak,
1970; Litwak and Hylton, 1962).
However, it must be emphasized that features of the federation
itself were found to alter or enhance the relationships for each of
the hypotheses.

It was not simply that hypotheses were not confirmed.

Rather we can assert that it was agents or factors which emanated from
the federation which led to the different results.
particular

Two factors in

can be recognized.

First, the analyses just completed indicate that many .of these
factors were associated with the network structure of relationships.
This structure featured certain distinct consequences for interorganizational behavior.

The referral design, for example, which was

created and altered by the administration component juxtaposed by
agency demands, functioned most conspicuously to shape the flow of
resources within the federation.
qther network characteristics contributed more indirectly to
how the project developed.

Because the project created boundaries for

relationships, the interactions were more intense and frequent, which
in turn enhanced the significance of the production process.

Similarly,

the umbrella of time in which these relationships could develop or endure may in itself have contributed to the stability of the federation.
In short, the network of relationships in the federation could be
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altered to achieve a shape not as likely found in other interorganizational fields.
The underlying dynamic entwining the interorganizational network
was that the federation was seen as a collectivity in itself.

That is,

the federation--its hierarchy, division of labor, collectivity
orientation of the agencies, etc.--was considered by the agencies comprising it to be a force in establishing these causal parameters.

It

was often regarded as underlying the regulation of alternatives available, the number of participating organizations, and the distribution
of referral patterns.
The second, and most important, factor is that the federation as
a collectivity became an overriding contingency for agencies to consider in making decisions about resources.

Agency representatives did

not stress the resources gained or expended in any particular project
relationships.

In fact, the organizations did not generally calculate

the rewards and the costs of participation in any single relationships
with other contracted agency.

Instead, dyadic relationships were en-

meshed within the network of organizations.
Most of the rewards mentioned were associated with the broader
operations of the federation.

Almost all of the agencies felt that

affiliation with the project had benefited their internal operations.
For example, several stated that their record-keeping and accounting
procedures had been refined, and that the staff and operations of
their agencies had been enlarged.

Next, virtually all the agencies

stated that their domain within the community had been enhanced.
Affiliation with a publicized project was seen as instrumental in pro-

1
I
I

mating ties with the community, including a clientele of aged and a

I

coterie of other service providers.
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Finally, all agencies mentioned

~

that participation in the federation had facilitated a grasp of how to

I

link with other agencies, including simply their availability as well
as the prohibitions and procedures for establishing linkage.
It is equally important, however, to note that the pattern for
assessing costs of participation with the project was similar to that
for rewards:

the federation as a whole was seen as responsible for

certain agency ills and interagency antagonisms.

For example, two of

the referral agencies felt that the project's publicity had to some
extent usurped the community credit which these agency's efforts
deserved.
Regarding the federation's system of operation, all but one
agency found the project's emphasis on serving only a certified
clientele to be something of a hindrance in stimulating non-contracted
service exchantes.

The general shortage of staffing which plagued most

agencies in the project, coupled with the everyday exigencies of providing services and coordinating efforts, were usually summed up by
workers as the "frustrations" of participation in a federation.

Such

irritations as "slowness" or delays in feedback were generalized

a~

systemic problems and not usually mentioned as issues specifically
regarding another agency.
The data indicate that the federation was regarded as a network
from which rewards, costs, and ·resource alternatives emanated.

In

addition to mediating relationships, affiliation with this larger
collectivity superseded the importance of deciding whether to link with

1
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any particular agency.

Relations with multiple organizations had to

be considered when evaluating a particular transaction with another
agency.
a whole.

The initial issue was whether to partipate in the project as
After that, the issue was how to participate.

The idea that organizational decision-making depends upon the

..
~

;

characteristics of the network in which that organization is enmeshed
involves a twist to the "norms of rationality" presumed to govern

!
I

interorganizational relationships (Thompson, 1967).

It is not that

organizations eschew rationality or neglect their own interests.
Rather, in this case any "rational calculation" was encumbered by considering the complexity of the resources which relationships with the
federation offered.

Agency strategies of participation within the

federative context clearly required a complicated scale of "satisfying"
or weighing of many factors which ac·crued with participation.

Thus,

what defines self-interest can become nebulous.
One example involves autonomy of decision-making.

Though the

agencies appeared to lose some autonomy, this was compensated in part
by the added certainty and mediation of relationships which participation in the federation helped provide.

Moreover, as Azumi (1972) has

pointed out, while autonomy of an agency within the federation is perhaps lessened, the autonomy of the network of organizations can be
increased.

That is, the added bargaining power and visibility through

participation in the network can facilitate transactions with agencies
outside the federation.
Many of these factors developed over the course of the project.
For example, there surfaced a normative or value component which

1
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stressed the importance beth of unity of effort and of the needs of
the clientele.

Indeed, this was fostered in part by the administrative

component and in part by the agencies themselves.

For the latter

(especially the referral agencies) these values did correspond nicely
with a rhetoric of "advocacy" for the elderly, in part serving to
legitimate their activities.
This conceptualization contrasts with those which characterize
organizational decision-making as existing within dyadic contexts.
Many propositions, such as with reciprocity (Levine and White, 1961)
and resource dependence (Aldrich, 1976)
similar to social choice fields.

tend to assume conditions

Their emphasis was that given con-

ditions of uncertainty, organizations would "rationally" consider the
alternatives available (Thompson, 1967).

All this sometimes ignores

how organizations can be involved in ongoing networks of relationships.
It is significant that much of this literature has tried to predict
the initiation rather than the maintenance or re-directing of
relationships.

The final chapter considers the implications of these

findings for developing a model of interorganizational fields.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION - TOWARD A MODEL OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS
Interorganizational relationships can adopt many different configurations .. This paper has documented one type of configuration, a
federation of social service agencies, as it operated over a two year
period.

Other patterns of relationships and the conditions under

which they emerge have been presented in the literature (see Litwak,
1970; Hage, 1975; Reid, 1964).

In his typology of interorganizational

fields, Warren (1967) acknowledged this diversity when he differentiated four types of configuration.

These fields varied according to

certain characteristics, including hierarchy, division of labor, and
collectivity orientation.
Yet the consequences of participation in these different contexts
have been given inadequate attention.
two of these deficiencies.

Warren's typology illustrates

Though it identifies many important

elements, it lacks an objective.

Whereas the typology succeeds in

establishing an interorganizational level of analysis, it does not
really specify any dependent variables or phenomena which result from
the differences in interorganizational fields.

Warren only suggests

that "new forms of interaction" can eme.rge with different contexts; he
does not elaborate upon what these might be.
Second, the intero.rganizational field typology

~eglects

nature of the organizational response to different contexts.

the
It ignores
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how organizations make decisions to interact depending upon the kinds
of contingencies or constraints presented to them.
its static conceptualization:

This results from

there is no discussion at this level of

analysis of the processes or development of interaction between
organizations.
In response to these deficiencies this paper has explored the
types of consequences which differentiate interorganizational contexts.
Though focusing upon a single case, its research has suggested that
across fields there can be significant differences in the relationships between variables.

Further, these differences run counter to

several prominent hypotheses on relationships between organizations.
What remains is to elaborate Warren's typology by outlining the
skeleton of the model of interorganizational contexts.
just described can be directly employed here.
objectives.

The findings

There are two basic

One is to predict which relationships between variables--

prestnning a relationship exists in one context--interact with interorganizational field conditions.

That is, what kinds of variables are

most affected by changing circumstances.
Second, the model must explain why certain relationships are
affected by context but not others.

This entails explicating the

nature of the dynamics or the causal process emanating from interorganizational field conditions.

For example, part of the explanation

must necessarily consider the nature of the organizational response to
the interorganizational conditions surrounding them.
Five elements comprise this model of interorganizational fields.
Included are the environment, the characteristics of interorganizational

l
I
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fields, the reward-cost calculation for organizations, the network
structure of relationships between organizations, and the types of
variables which are affected. This .model also displays the relationships between these elements.

Each is considered in turn.

The focus of "dependent variable" of the model is the range of
relationships between variables.

Depending upon how the variables are

categorized, a broad spectrum of variables could be encompassed.

The

typological scheme created in the second chapter illustrates such a
range.

Thus, the question becomes which of its four subsectors

(transactional, managerial, communication, or division of labor) will
predictably yield interaction effects which will maintain a stable
relationship across fields.

However, changes in the classification

schemes, such as using one by Van de Ven, Emmett, and Koenig (1975)
could produce different results.
I

\

An important element in the model is the environment.

This also

cJn be broken down by many categories or dimensions(see Hall, 1972;

i

A~drich,
c~mpeting

I972a). In any case it includes the number and size of possibly
organizations, the extent and sources of resources which are

aJailable, as well as the ethos, rhetorics or cultures surrounding
rJlationships between organizations (Warren, Rose, Bergunder, 1974).
Highly relevant are the authority structure and legal conditions which
can govern interaction, for obviously they can mandate, regulate, or
otherwise impinge upon relationships.

The environment also typically

creates the prevaili.ng technol.ogy both for organizations and for
relationships between them such as with computers or telephones.

This

may account for the smaller effects of the federation upon the production
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process than for the remaining subareas.

All these factors can

directly affect other elements in the model.
The environment also exerts indirect effects by affecting the
creation and operation of interorganizational fields themselves.

In

the case study just presented an agency outside the federation (the
state agency for the

ag~ng)

disbursed funds provided by the federal

government, as mandated by Congress.

The community itself proved to

be receptive and even supportive to this federation, in contrast to
some programs organized through the War on Poverty (see Warren, Rose
and Bergunder, 1974).
However, this model does grant causal significance to the fields,
just as Warren (1967) advocated.

The characteristics differentiating

interorganizational fields have also been discussed (see Chapter I).
The significant feature of the model is its specification of two
effects of interorganizational fields, the calculus for rewards and
costs and the network structure exhibited in the interactions of the
organizations.
The calculation of rewards and costs by the organizations involved
in a federation or other field becomes an element in this model.

This

calculation process involves the various resources which organizations
typically desire for self-maintenance.
do emanate from the environment.

These resources can and often

However, characteristics of the

interorganizational field organize and distribute the resources.

The

participating organizations must acknowledge these patterns depending
upon, for example, if they wish to compete or cooperate with organizations in that field (see Thompson and McEwen, 1972).
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Resources are always important to organizations, but the
definition of a resource can vary. In this case study the organizations
considered a number of factors which were quite interwoven with participation in the federation, including a normative element, the reciprocity which was less direct and which prevailed over time, and the
lessened dependence upon any organization in particular.

The sheer

complexity of decision-making under these circumstances leads to an
altered calculation of what is beneficial to the organizations.
The second identifiable element stemming from the characteristics
of fields is the network structure of relationships.
had numerous consequences for this federation.
set of relationships, which

res~lted

interdependence of interaction.

This structure

It featured a boundaried

in increasing the frequency and

The division of labor within the

federation affected the flow of resources and the asymmetry between
organizations, another network trait.

By restructuring the intensity

and direction of interactions, the federation enlarged the parameters
of relationships between variables.

These relationships thereby could

assume curvilinear form, as with the relationship between interdependence
and stability of relationships.

In short, the federation could create

network conditions not approximated in other fields.
Specifying these last two elements clarifies some of the contextua 1 effects which previously were nebulous.
veni?g processes
field.

~reated

They involved inter-

by the composition of the

~nterorganization

As w.ith the other elements of this model, they correspond to

cluster of variables which are important to theory construction
(Blalock, 1969).

This skeleton of a model thus remains an outline.
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·The purpose is to summarize the results of this case study by re-casting
the interorganizational field typology into a more purposeful and
specific mold.
Because this is a case study, this model necessarily leaves at
least two tasks for future research.

First, the importance or overall

contribution of each element remains to be tested.

A comparative

design exploring multiple cases is essential here, with attention
particularly given to variance in the environmental and interorganizational field elements.

Obviously, a complete test would not just

examine similarly funded federations, but would include a range of
environmental circumstances and interorganizational fields.

In

addition, this test would require greater specification of variables
for each element.
On a more limited focus, comparative research could establish
how much impact the interorganizational fields does have.

There is

considerable debate about the potential of federative arrangements
for yielding more "effective" services (Hall, 1972).

Levine, White,

and Vlasak (1972) argue that federal funding for federations of health
agencies "does little in itself to integrate the functions of the
various organizations and indeed leads to fission in the system."
In contrast, ·Hage (.1975) maintains that structures similar to federations are viable for incorporating the delivery of services within
the community context to produce at once a more accountable and more
effective coalition of interested parties.

In either case more consid-

eration of these contexts seems necessary as environments become more
consolidated or turbulent (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Emery and Trist;
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1965).
The second task involves noting additional elements which the
model could include.

For instance, a significant element left unincor-

porated involves the development or change of a field over time.

In

this case study developmental variables appeared frequently, albeit
in multiple guises.

Agency administrators and project leaders them-

selves often mentioned that there are stages to such interorganizational endeavors.

Their implication was that which factors are crucial can

change as the project gets altered, that different factors can be more
salient to the project as it develops.

For example, pooling and ob-

taining sufficient resources for the project are especially crucial in
initial stages, whereas the style of project leadership and the
"connnitment" exhibited by agencies can assume more importance as
operations get underway.
The literature on the development or emergence of relationships
over time is sparse but suggestive.

Hall and Clark (1975) sketch the

proposition that "interorganizational relationships have an impact on
themselves.

Interactions once begun contribute to the quantity and

quality of subsequent interactions."

In an insightful discussion of

social intervention agencies, Spergel (1969:128) outlines five phases
of organizational-development, including initial interorganizational
structures and the

st~ggle

to modify them over time.

He speculates

that understanding this developmental process should assist anticipating
and perhaps mi tigati_ng many problems or conflicts of interest which are
likely to emerge duri_ng a project.
Indeed, a model of st.ages may be one way to incorporate conflict

l
;
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variables.

Overcoming some interorganizational hurdles creates the

conditions for other conflict situations.

In this conceptualization

conflict and agency self-interest can be explicitly considered as
endemic to a federation rather than being optimistically written off.
The findings about interdependence in the preceding chapter serve to
illustrate that integrated action is fraught with dilemmas.
These considerations uphold the usefulness of considering interorganizational fields.

Mustering resources and relevant agencies is

only the inception of a larger flow of interaction.

An understanding

of the interorganizational structures which can be established and of
the appeasement of the self-interests of participating agencies becomes
crucial.

The importance of these factors was illustrated in this

study of a social service federation, where they affected the viability
and maintenance of interorganizational relationships.

:-
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